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ABSTRACT

AN ANALYSIS OF THE MERGERS
OF AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
FEBRUARY 1993
THOMAS M. MULVEY, A.B., PROVIDENCE COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND
Ed.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor David F. Schuman

American higher education has been affected by spiraling cost,
declining college-age population, decreasing financial aid and defense
grants, budget reductions from state governments and concerns about
quality.

The merging of two or more institutions into a single entity is

one strategy to cope with these changes.

The literature on the subject

of merger, however, is fragmented and dwells mainly on the reasons
why institutions merge.

This study examines the tensions and

elements that constitute the merger phenomenon in its totality and
identifies implications for implementation.
The study analyzed 18 doctoral dissertation case studies of 20
higher educational mergers that took place during the period 19641985.

Similarities and differences were identified and the findings

compared with the merger literature.

The data were then interpreted

from the perspective of organizational change.
The analysis indicated that three major tensions shape the merger
phenomenon:

the clash between maintaining the status quo and

implementing change; the emergence of one institution as the

v

dominant party thereby exacerbating the change for the subordinate
party; and the accomplishment of organizational objectives at the
expense of individual needs.

A pattern emerged indicating that

change was not managed, decision-making was top down and selfcentered, crisis was not anticipated, power was used to dominate,
conflict was divisive, planning was non-existent or poorly done and
implementation was characterized by limited strategies to facilitate
the process.
Several important distinctions were identified according to the
type of control of the merging institutions.

Differences were found in

the impelling reasons, motivation, process stages, type of risk, degree
of consultation and outcomes.

Exceptions to the conventional wisdom

that financially troubled institutions should not merge were noted.
Also, a simple legal maneuver frequently employed in the corporate
world was identified as an alternative to the standard merger
approach.
In order to facilitate the complex process of a merger and to
address the identified problems, the application of the integrated
frames approach for managing organizational change as developed by
Bolman and Deal [1984] is recommended.

Strategic planning is also

recommended as an effective tool for coping with change.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the goals of higher education is to produce change in
people and the society in which they function.

Institutions of higher

education themselves are in turn subject to change.

They exist in a

dynamic environment in which political, economic, social and religious
factors have traditionally changed their goals, programs and structure.
As a result of these factors, many American institutions of higher
education have either closed or merged since the founding of the first
college. 1

At the current time, declining college-age population,

spiraling cost, decreases in financial aid and defense grants, and
revenue short falls for state governments are some of the factors that
affect colleges and universities.

The merging of two or more

institutions into a single entity is one strategy to cope with these
changes.
study:

This leads to the two-fold fundamental question of this
What are the dynamic tensions and elements that constitute

the merger phenomenon in higher education and what are their
implications for implementing a merger?

In answering this question,

I found that change itself produces basic tensions that shape and
influence the merger phenomenon.
I did not start this study with an understanding of the importance
of change in the merger phenomenon.
the study.

It evolved during the course of

At the outset, it was my sense that the mergers of

institutions of higher education involved problems with their
implementation and aftermath.

I based this on my personal

experience as both a participant and observer of three separate
mergers in higher education.2

As the study evolved, it became

2

apparent that a merger was frequently viewed by policy makers and
administrators as an event and not as a complex process involving
significant change.

Change manifested itself in the three major

tensions identified in the study that shape the merger phenomenon:
(a) the clash between maintaining the status quo and implementing
change; (b) the emergence of one institution as the dominant party
thereby exacerbating the change for the subordinate party; and (c) the
accomplishment of organizational objectives at the expense of
individual needs in a situation involving change.

The apparent lack of

understanding of these tensions and the dynamics of change is a
contributing factor to the problems associated with the
implementation of the merger process.

This study substantiates the

contention of Bugliarello and Urrows [1976] that the lack of
information about the merger of institutions of higher education is
aggravated by the myth that they are easy to carry out.
It is important to know how this study evolved.

Based on my

initial observations that there are problems associated with merging
institutions and a desire to find out if it could be done better, I decided
to investigate the subject further.

In turning to the literature to learn

more about the merger of colleges and universities, I found
fragmentation and a degree of incompleteness.^
comprehensive study on the subject.
conducted by John Millet [1976].

There is only one

This is an analysis of 10 mergers

The rest of the literature is

concentrated mainly in the area of describing the reasons why
institutions merged.

How institutions implemented a merger and the

resulting outcomes were dealt with to a much lesser extent.

The

literature gave me some direction, but lacked the depth and scope to
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provide a complete understanding of the merger phenomenon.

In

support of this conclusion. Chambers [1981a] maintains that there is
little knowledge presented in the literature on how institutions should
merge.

Others have concluded that the mergers in higher education

have attracted little attention in the literature in comparison to the
mergers that take place in the business world [Bugliarello and Urrows,
1976].
To learn more about specific mergers, I next turned to a search of
the Dissertation Abstracts International

to locate case studies.

This

search yielded a total of 18 dissertation case studies written between
1974 and 1990 on 20 separate mergers.

To my surprise, these studies

had not been synthesized nor referenced in the literature.

At this

point in my investigation, I felt that I had discovered an untapped
source of data concerning the merger phenomenon.

I felt excitement

at the prospect of examining the thick description of the case studies
for new information.

Would the results of my exploration reinforce,

contradict, expand or further explain the current literature?

I decided

at this point that it would be of greater value to analyze and compare
these case studies rather than conduct yet another case study on an
individual

merger.

Having completed the review of literature in the standard
manner, the next question became how to proceed with the analysis of
the case studies.

The full-text microfiche copies of these dissertations

were first purchased from University Microfilms International.
list of dissertations is contained in Appendix A.

The

The mergers analyzed

by the dissertation case studies are listed in Appendix B.

Each case

study was then analyzed in-depth and systematically by using the
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constant comparative methodology of Lincoln and Guba [1985].
not formulate any a priori hypotheses.

I did

As I read each dissertation,

points and factors that were deemed to be important were placed
under the broad category to which it pertained:
outcome.

reasons, process or

These points and findings in each major category were then

analyzed across the studies.

This resulted in the emergence of various

subcategories from the data.

The subcategories were then evaluated

which led to the formulation of various themes.

According to Patton

[1980], case studies can be compared and contrasted in this manner to
identify similarities, differences and idiosyncrasies.4
Now that I had all these data grouped into categories and various
themes, I was prepared to compare them to the conventional wisdom
derived from the review of literature.

Through this comparison, I

found areas where the case studies substantiated and differed with
the literature.

There were also areas where data from the case studies

further delineated or explained various statements and suppositions
contained in the literature.
Having completed this stage of the research, the study still lacked
a frame within which I could understand the merger phenomenon in
its totality.

I knew how the mergers described in the case studies

related to each other and how they compared with the current
literature, but something was missing.

Stepping back from the details

of the data, I dwelled on two fundamental characteristics of the
merger phenomenon:

change and its organizational impact.

To find

out more about these two characteristics, I decided to reread Modern
Approaches to Understanding and Managing Organizations by Bolman
and Deal [1984].

This led me to the conclusion that this work could
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provide a useful frame to interpret the data.

This perspective applied

to the mass of data generated by the multi-case study analysis and its
subsequent comparison to the literature provided a framework for me
to discern tensions, differences and patterns in the data.

This in turn

led to an understanding of what was happening and why it was
happening in a merger situation within the context of organizational
change.

The tensions between forces for change and the status quo

and the reaction of groups and individuals to change were identified.
The work of Bolman and Deal [1984] not only assisted me in
understanding the totality of the merger phenomenon, but it also
provided the foundation for developing recommendations on how
policy makers and implementors can facilitate the merger process.
They maintain that various theories of organization can be grouped
under four major categories:
symbolic.

rational, human resource, political and

These groupings of the major schools of thought according to

coherent perspectives of reality are called frames.^

Bolman and Deal

posit that to understand the complexity of an organization, one should
view it through the perspective of the four frames.

In order for an

organization to be managed successfully, managers must "rely
intuitively on the different frames, blending them into a coherent,
pragmatic, personal theory of organizations" [p. 6].

By integrating the

frames, managers can respond to change by striving to attain an
alignment within the organization, that is, the matching of structure,
people, politics and symbols to one another so that they are mutually
supporting.
It is appropriate to interpret the merger phenomenon within an
organizational change context because an institution involved in a
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merger is an organization that is undergoing alterations in its
structure, procedures and rituals.

The use of power and the allocation

of resources are very much a part of the merger process.

Individuals

within the organization—trustees, faculty, staff, students and
alumni—are affected in various ways by a merger.

There often exists

a tension between organizational ends and individual needs.

By

focusing on the change aspects of the merger phenomenon, insights
and understanding can be generated by interpreting the case study
findings in a broader and congruent context.
The purpose then of this study has evolved into one that seeks an
understanding of the merger phenomenon in higher education in its
totality (its causes, process and outcomes) and the subsequent
implications for managing it.

This is accomplished in the following

manner:
1. The patterns and categories involved in the mergers of
institutions of higher education are identified.
2. The similarities and differences of the mergers are
analyzed and compared to the literature to determine
the conditions and elements that structure the merger
phenomenon.
3. Based on an understanding of these conditions and elements,
strategies that assist policy-makers in deciding on and
implementing a merger are presented.
In the first chapter of the dissertation, the merger literature for the
past twenty years is reviewed.

The chapter focuses on four major aspects

of the merger phenomenon—change, process, reasons creating the need
for change and outcomes.

Within each of these aspects, various themes
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are identified and discussed.

They include:

the drastic nature of the

required changes; the dominance of one of the parties; the negative
impact on individuals; the complex process involving negotiations and
legal issues; the impelling factors of financial exigency and political
considerations; and the accomplishment of goals at a cost to individuals.
In Chapter 2 the reasons why the institutions in this study sought to
merge are examined.

This leads to the clear distinction that public

institutions are merged for different reasons than private institutions.
For the former, the overriding reason is public policy initiatives to
accommodate expanded educational opportunity and efficiency.

For the

latter group, the need to resolve financial exigency is the main reason.
Although the motives are different, they share the common tension
between forces for change and the status quo.

They are similar in their

pragmatic nature and the use of power in a hierarchical manner.

They

also share the characteristic of the promotion of self-interest of groups
within a context of scarce resources.
Chapter 3 focuses on the complexity of the merger process.

As the

process moves from the initiation stage to the negotiation stage, the
emergence of one institution as the dominant force plays a key role in
affecting the negotiations and changing initial expectations of the
subordinate institution.

Protecting self-interest, competing demands from

various groups with differing beliefs, hierarchical decision-making and
lack of consultation contribute to conflict during the process.
adequate planning emerges as an important factor.

The lack of

Leadership and legal

issues also play a role in affecting the process.
In Chapter 4 the classic tension between organizational ends and
individual needs in a merger situation is presented.

The evaluation
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indicates that the changes brought about by the mergers accomplish their
institutional objectives at the cost of negatively affecting participants.
Anger, bitterness and anxiety are byproducts of the process.

Members of

the less dominant institution experience decreased satisfaction with their
jobs and the merger itself.
In the final chapter, the synthesis of the findings concerning the
reasons, process and outcomes leads to the general understanding of
the merger phenomenon as a complex process in which change plays a
major role.

It concludes that significant change, crisis, conflict,

hierarchical decision-making, negative impacts on individuals,
dominance and poor planning are common elements of the merger
process.

A secondary conclusion is that the case studies are a valuable

research source that provide the study with important distinctions not
readily apparent in the literature.

Based on an understanding of these

common elements and specific differences, recommendations to utilize
management strategies from the structural, human resource, political
and symbolic perspectives in an integrated manner to facilitate change
are presented.

Strategic planning is also recommended as mechanism

to enhance the merger process.
It is important to note that the goal of this study is not to predict
what will happen in every merger situation.

In this study, a mosaic of

understanding resulting from a synthesis of the elements, influences,
patterns and implications of the merger phenomenon emerges.

The

recommendations of this study should help participants in
implementing and coping with the merger process.
The ultimate goal of this study is to contribute to making merger
less traumatic and disruptive by providing a better understanding of
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its nature and by presenting guidance on how to implement one in an
effective manner.

As a result of this study, I believe that a merger can

be an appropriate strategy in dealing with change provided we
recognize the role that change itself plays in the merger process.

10

Notes
1

Since the founding of Harvard in 1636 through 1979, there have
been approximately 2,000 mergers or closings of institutions
of higher education [West 1980]. During the decade of the 1970s,
a total of 45 independent institutions merged and from 1980
through 1987, at least 11 institutions have merged according to
the National Institute of Independent Colleges and Universities
[1989]. Although comparable statistics do not exist for public
institutions, a number of mergers have occurred over the same
period of time.

2

The three mergers were a) New Bedford Institute of Technology
and Bradford-Durfee College of Technology into Southeastern
Massachusetts Technological Institute; b) the Swain School of Art
with Southeastern Massachusetts University's College of Visual
and Performing Arts; and c) the merger of the University of
Lowell, Southeastern Massachusetts University and the University
of Massachusetts.

3

The literature starting with 1970 was identified by employing an
ERIC search for journal articles and books using the main
identifiers of mergers and institutions of higher education.
Bibliographies of the reports and articles identified through the
ERIC search were also reviewed for pertinent works.

4

This treatment of the qualitative data of the case studies is the
analogue of meta-analysis in quantitative research.

5

The four frames are described by Bolman and Deal [1984] as
follows:
a.

b.

The structural frame emphasizes the importance of formal
roles and relationships. Organizational structures are
created to fit an organization's environment and
technology.
The human resource frame stresses that the organization
should be tailored to people. An organizational form is
sought to enable people to get the job done while feeling
good about their job.

11

c.

d.

The political frame views organizations as arenas of scarce
resources where power and influence are constantly
affecting the allocation of resources among individuals or
groups.
The symbolic frame considers the organization not in
rational terms, but as theater or carnival. Organizations
are viewed as held together more by shared values and
culture than by goals and policies.

CHAPTER 1
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
In analyzing the literature written during the period 1966-90 on
mergers in higher education, various tensions emerge.

They include the

drastic changes for institutions and constituents, the complex process of
negotiating terms, the financial and political factors that are impelling
reasons and the negative impact on individuals.

This chapter will address

these tensive issues and their related aspects, identify alternatives and
conclude with a summary of major points.
Merger Changes and Their Effects
By its very nature, a merger involves drastic change.

In

examining the generic definition of merger stated in the Introduction,
it is obvious that the formal act of combining two or more institutions
into a single corporate entity significantly changes the participating
entities.

Not only are governing boards affected, but the nature of the

involved institutions is altered and their various constituencies must
cope with change.
drastic and dramatic.

Several writers have described these changes as
Cannon [1983] identifies merger as the most

extreme form of inter-institutional arrangements.

She concludes that

institutions "undergo marked organizational changes which are in
drastic contrast to those of institutions engaged in cooperation and
coordination" [p. 5].

O'Neill and Barnett [1980] see merger as the most

complete form of inter-institutional change because two or more legal
entities become one.

Bugliarello and Urrows [1976] describe it in the

most dramatic terms as a drastic act with "irreversible totality—the
legal death of one or both parties in the creation of a new one" [p. 102].

They conclude that it is an extreme answer to problems and concerns
facing institutions of higher education.
The drastic nature of the change to the governing body of an
institution is evident when the two major types of merger are
examined.

O'Neill and Barnett [1980] give a clear description of

these two types:*
In a consolidation merger, two or more corporations
dissolve their respective legal identities and become a
wholly new corporation carrying forth all the properties
and obligations of the former corporation.
A dissolution/acquisition merger involves an agreement
under which one institution is legally dissolved and its
assets and liabilities are acquired with court approval
by the surviving institution, [p. 20]
Under each type, there is a loss of identity and autonomy for
at least one partner.

In a consolidation merger, Cannon [1983]

maintains that because each institution loses its identity and
autonomy and becomes an integral part of a new system, it follows
that merger is an extreme change.

Chambers [1981b] points out

that about halfway through the 1970s mergers shifted from
consolidation to the acquisition type, which represents a very
powerful strategy for radical change.
In her studies, Chambers raises the critical issue of
dominance in the merger phenomena.

She maintains that during the

1970s, models suggesting equality between merging institutions
had little success because the "prevalent atmosphere was one
in which dominance became the issue" [1983, p. 5].

She

concludes that what started out as a consolidation of equals, most
frequently ended up as an acquisition with one entity dominating.

When this happens, the dominate institutions will "most certainly be
thinking in terms of radical change for the colleges they acquire"
[1981b, p. 93].
When one institution is in a dominant position, changes in
mission, programs and procedures for the weaker institution can
be profound.

This is especially true when a private institution seeks

to merge with a public one.

Bogue [1981] points out that this type of

merger results in public control that weakens the distinctive mission
and autonomy of the private college.

In addition, the private

institution must adjust to a legion of administrative changes ranging
from state regulations and procedures to reporting relationships to
personnel policies [Shirley and Peters, 1976].

The dominance of the

public partner resulting in change of mission, loss of autonomy and
increased bureaucratization are probably the reasons for
Bugliarello and Urrows' [1976] finding that mergers between private
institutions are more readily accomplished than between mixed
control colleges.
The significant changes brought about by merger are not
limited to the governing boards, mission, programs and procedures
of the institutions.
affected.

The various constituent groups are definitely

O'Neill and Barnett [1980] posit that merging colleges is at

best a stressful situation.

They conclude that trustees and senior

administrators "must be prepared to understand the effects of this
stress on staff, on students, and even on alumni and their families, and
they must be prepared to deal with them sympathetically and
effectively" [p. 85].

This is succinctly stated in the observation that

institutions can be partitioned, contracted and redesigned but people

can not [McKeefery, 1981].

This stress increases the probability of

resisting organizational change and according to O'Neill and Barnett
[1980], triggers anger, bitterness, resentment, uncertainty and anxiety
that may cause health problems.
West [1980] maintains that merger is a traumatic experience
characterized by tension and anxiety for both internal and
external constituencies.

This trauma is vividly described by

Benezet [1983] as a thunderclap and bolt of lightning that gives
a sense of uneasiness and a lack of confidence.

This could account for

the high probability of significant losses in the number of current
faculty and students and alumni support in a merger situation
identified by Gorman and Pappas [1989].

The importance of coping

with stress is underscored by Cannon [1983] who concludes that the
"success and viability of merger depends upon the participants'
response to the changes demanded by merger" [p. 11].2
The sense of loss resulting from merger appears to be greatest
within the faculty ranks.

Cannon [1983], Cass [1967], Peters [1977],

Mingle, et al [1981], and Millett [1976], all found that mergers have a
negative impact on faculty members.

The impact factors included

lower status, job loss, circumvention of contractual obligations, reduced
level of job satisfaction, role tension, anxiety, loss of communal spirit,
split between various faculty groups, and dissatisfaction with a new
environment.

Bugliarello and Urrows [1976] posit that a merger at its

worst causes an avalanche of resignations and can poison institutional
esprit during the course of negotiation.

Even when a merger has been

judged to be highly successful, morale can be adversely affected.
the Case Western Reserve situation, for example, Fischer [1978]

In

reports that 11 years after the merger some faculty still had morale
problems stemming from feelings of uncertain identity.

She explains

that prior to the merger, faculty had a sense of belonging to either the
liberal arts or science/technology sphere.
not as clear cut.

After the merger, this was

Wyatt [1986] sees merger as affecting morale by

producing feelings of agony and powerlessness resulting from a direct
attack on stability, which some faculty equate with professional
fulfillment.
Aside from the obvious concern over future employment for
those involved in a merger, other factors have been identified as
contributing to the strong emotional response on the part of various
constituent groups.

Thompson [1985] stipulates that people associated

with higher education believe that educational institutions must be
certain of success and cannot fail, even though they are subject to the
same rapid changes in social, political and economic factors that cause
businesses to fail.

In the same vein, Benezet [1983] argues that people

view an institution of higher education as a stable center of learning.
When it comes to an abrupt or unforeseen end, the reaction is one
of shock.

Wyatt [1986] maintains that the closing of colleges is viewed

as unnatural because of a tradition of people relying on and trusting
institutions and the overall record of growth and expansion of higher
education.

People are thus conditioned to "look to the sunrise rather

than the sunset" [p. 22].

Likewise, alumni tend to resist a merger

because it "sullies a nostalgic vision of their youth" [Bugliarello and
Urrows, 1976, p. 107].
It is interesting to note that not all participants in a merger are
affected in the same manner.

Where there is a perception that a

merger is an acquisition rather than a marriage of equal institutions,
employees of the acquired institution experience negative impacts.
Shirley and Peters [1976] state it very specifically, "anxieties are
exacerbated when employees already perceive themselves to be
members of the weaker party to the merger" [p. 147].

In their case

study, they found that the perceived dependency and subordination
by the faculty and staff of the less dominant institution led to a
stepchild

mentality.

How participants feel about a merger is also affected by their
basic beliefs of how things should be done.

Bennis [1977] observed

that veteran faculty members were hurt, indignant and angry at major
changes that took place at Buffalo shortly after it became part of the
State University of New York and resisted change because they were
not significantly involved in the planning.

These findings support the

contention of Gorman and Pappas [1989] that in a merger,
organizational cultures of the two institutions must be examined
"because ultimately the success or failure will be determined by the
individual and collective behaviors, beliefs and assumptions of people"
[p. B3].

They maintain that even the most elemental concepts may

have different meanings across institutions and failure to recognize
this can be fatal to meeting strategic objectives.
In addressing the negative effects that merger has on
participants, it may be helpful to consider the experience of business
mergers in dealing with this particular outcome.

Institutions of higher

education are certainly not the same as for-profit businesses; they
have vastly different missions.

This does not mean, however, that

institutions are unable to learn from business and adapt their solutions

to similar problems being faced by higher education.
certain characteristics common to all bureaucracies.3

They do share
Unfortunately

much of the literature on business mergers is focused on economic/
financial analysis of market forces and values of stock and as such
does not apply to educational mergers [Chambers, 1986].^
Business firms have a long record of using mergers and
acquisitions to facilitate growth [Shirley and Peters, 1976].

Shirley and

Peters conclude that college administrators "may well be advised to
study the organizational lessons already learned in business mergers"
[p. 152].

They state that in the business sector, acquisitions are "too

often consummated with little advance planning concerning post¬
merger relationships and operations" [p. 147].

They found that this

was also true in a merger of two colleges that they studied.

In

horizontal business mergers of companies in different geographical
areas, Shirley and Peters maintain that the resulting causes of
resistance to change by employees have counterparts in academic
mergers.

They identify achieving a balance between autonomy and

centralization, dealing with employee anxiety and establishing
communication mechanisms as major issues that must be addressed to
provide a smooth transition.
In their comprehensive analysis of business mergers, Buono
and Bowditch [1989] state that the turmoil, confusion and tension
that employees experience can undo the most careful financial and
strategic planning.

In order to deal with this turmoil and the clash of

cultures, they recommend establishing transition teams, offering
morale boosting activities, creating effective communication channels,
providing counseling and workshops for employees and conducting

surveys to track morale.

They also are concerned that research

indicates that "human resource considerations play a relatively small
role in merger and acquisition decisions" [p. 22].

They conclude that it

is unfortunate that most analysts involved in merger assessments
usually disregard human dynamics and the financial ramifications of
post merger personnel problems.^
The Merger Process
A merger, with its variety of required changes, is not an event
but rather a process.

The tensions in the dynamics of this process also

center on factors associated with change in any organization.

These

issues include risk, uncertainty, negotiation, leadership and planning.
Legal issues and the possibility of litigation also complicate the
process.

In his extensive case study, Millett [1976] found that the

process of merger is not a simple procedure and is time-consuming.
Within this process, he stipulates that the conducting of negotiation
and the reaching of agreement can be laborious. This is vividly
detailed by Dr. Eldon Smith of the National Council of Independent
Colleges and Universities who is quoted as saying that "negotiating a
permanent new structure is such a punishing process that many
institutions get to the verge of merger but do not show up at the altar"
[Bugliarello and Urrows, 1976, pp. 101-102].

Chambers [1981a] in her

study of mergers in New York state concluded that they represent a
"multiplication of institutional complexity with problems so
idiosyncratic that each merger must be hand-tailored" [p. 26].

This is

probably why she describes merger as a daring adventure that is "as
tough as it gets" [1983, p. 23].
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Negotiation Issues
There are several issues relating to the actual merger process.
The first centers around issues involving confidentiality and
consultation.

At the initial stage of consideration, presidents, key

administrators and trustees are usually involved in determining if the
merger is desirable [Millett, 1976].

If the initial response is favorable,

then negotiation of particulars are initiated.

Millett notes that there is

a tendency for negotiation to be conducted in an atmosphere of
secrecy and that there is "little disposition on the part of presidents to
discuss the desirability of merger with faculty leaders, student leaders
or community leaders" [p. 34].

He claims that any such discussions

would become public knowledge and most likely lead to efforts to
prevent the merger.
The balance between confidentiality and consultation is not
easily attained.

Fischer [1978] states that in the Case/Westem

Reserve merger, faculty were not consulted in advance because
they would not have approved the merger.
on their part.

This led to indignation

Although Benezet [1983] recommends some secrecy in

the early stages, he posits that "all too often the tremors that come
with a proposed merger reflect a poor communication system between
the administration and the faculty and the student body" [p. 41].

He

concludes that the operational meaning of consultation is difficult and
controversial, but if genuine progress is made on this chronic problem,
the results will better prepare institutions for merger.

His view is

shared by Chambers [1983], Bugliarello and Urrows [1976], and
Thompson [1985].

The second major issue involving the process of merger is the
negotiation of matters pertaining to the faculty and staff.
area that the process can be the most difficult.

It is in this

The transfer of faculty

and staff has been identified as a major sore point in negotiations
between merging institutions [O’Neill and Barnett, 1980].

They

maintain that ’’the number of faculty jobs offered to the smaller
partner is almost bound to be a source of disenchantment" [p. 27].
They conclude that the dealing with faculty and staff issues is one of
the most time-consuming and difficult areas because legal, moral and
psychological issues are entwined with decisions.

Thompson [1970]

similarly contends that mergers are not easy because of resistance.
This surfaces because the status of individuals will be changed, pride
in institutional identity is threatened and personnel policies are
modified.

The absorption of faculty "creates the greatest obstacle to an

affiliation" [Thompson, 1985, p. 22].

He maintains that faculty are not

only concerned about job security, but also facilities, equipment,
teaching load and research expectations.

He also cites that collective

bargaining agreements can exacerbate negotiations.
Failure to address faculty concerns could certainly complicate the
merger process.

Peters [1977] theorizes that his finding that faculty

problems impeded achievement of merger objectives resulted from
their low level of participation in merger negotiations.6

Another

danger is that if faculty feel that they will not benefit from merger,
some of the ablest and most mobile will go elsewhere [Bugliarello and
Urrows, 1976].
The third major issue involving the merger process concerns
reputation and financial risks.

Where institutions have not had a
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history of cooperation, a substantial difference in reputation may
serve to block the merger.

When reputations are balanced, the

successor would benefit from preserving both identities which in turn
would make merger easier to negotiate [Chambers, 1983].

Chambers

concludes that differences in reputation will pervade negotiations and
"probably more than any other single factor determine their outcome"
[p. 11].

This is substantiated by the findings of a study [1987] she

conducted on private institution mergers that took place over the
course of a decade.
Associated with reputation is the issue of financial risk.

Since in

many instances at least one of the partners in a merger is experiencing
financial difficulty, fiscal matters including debt and credit become a
major consideration.

Issues such as financial obligations, endowments,

grants with restrictions, government funds, etc. must be resolved.
Thompson [1985] concludes that "the disposition of physical property
and the details associated with the financial aspects of merger involve
laborious proceedings" [p. 22].

Chambers [1981b] maintains that

"the most important factor colleges need to know about when
negotiating a merger is the basic financial structure that underlies the
process" [p. 97].

She concludes that not only must there be financial

gain for each party, there must be enough extra value for the
successor institution to make the merger worth all the risk and time.
The issue of financial risk can be minimized in negotiating a
merger.

O'Neill and Barnett [1980] stress that what one institution has

to offer another institution with a stronger market position must be
presented so that the merger is seen to be of value to both parties.
The strategy for the weaker institution is to present a package of both
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assets and liabilities and anticipate what value the other institution
will place on these assets and how that institution will respond to the
risks involved.

They state that the strategy for the stronger institution

must be to maximize the ability to fulfill its mission by securing
enrollment increases, property and endowment while minimizing
liability, such as taking over debt and tenured faculty who duplicate
current strength.

They conclude that the weaker institution should set

aside the collegial model of cooperation and "think instead of the
business arrangements that might prove workable given the devalued
worth of its assets" [p. 26].
Leadership and Planning
Leadership plays an important role in the merger process given
the sensitive nature of the issues to be negotiated.

Chambers [1983]

contends that "merger results from a very human act of assessment,
based on fallible perceptions, estimates and comparisons" [p. 8].
Within this context, she maintains that usually a strong leader, such as
a president, powerful trustee or donor, controls the direction of the
merger attempt.

In moving an institution through major change such

as a merger, Norman [1987] posits that strong leadership—a dynamic
and decisive president and board—is required.

Bugliarello and Urrows

[1976] also identify leadership as one of the important factors in
successful

mergers.

A major reason why leadership is important may stem from the
conservative nature of trustees.

Chambers [1983] contends that

boards of trustees, which have to make the final decision on mergers,
have both risk and uncertainty to contend with as issues.
the trust relationship, boards are not great risk takers.

Because of
She concludes

that "where neither outcomes nor their probabilities are known,
uncertainty adds to this already conservative slant, making it harder
to choose a risky venture, such as merger" [p. 9].
Leadership alone, however, can not guarantee a successful
process.

The literature is permeated with passages extolling the

need for careful planning of mergers.

Thompson [1985] advises

that strategic planning is essential, especially to accommodate the
emotional and political dimensions of a merger decision.

In his case

study of a failed merger attempt between Detroit Institute of
Technology and Wayne State University, he found that the primary
reason for failure was the lack of strategic planning.

Gorman and

Pappas [1989] similarly strongly support careful planning when
considering a merger.

They state that "all too often, merger planning

limits itself to the requisite legal transactions, changes in the policies
and procedures, and, perhaps, some strategic curricular reform"
[p. B3].

They claim this is done at the expense of formulating an

intentional implementation plan that addresses a fundamental
restructuring.

Also, Martin and Samels [1989], Shirley and Peters

[1976], and O'Neil and Barnett [1980] all point out the importance of
planning.
Despite detailed planning, unexpected issues and problems will
surface during the process.

A major conclusion of Millett's study

[1976] was that the process of merger and its implementation present
complexities not always foreseen.

This was also true for the Tennessee

State University merger in which Matlock and Humphries [1979] found
that the merger plan "as with all plans, could not possibly have
anticipated all the various merger-related contingencies" [p. 21].
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Lewis [1981] reaches a similar conclusion that a single merger
agreement can not answer all the important questions.
The literature indicates that when leaders are developing merger
plans and going through the process, they should continuously focus on
the positive outcomes for the successor institution [Chambers, 1983;
Millett, 1976; and Bugliarello and Urrows, 1976].

This will help all

concerned parties overcome the intermediate obstacles and problems.
Perhaps the accentuation of the positive is best summarized by
Chambers:

"College merger requires investment, knowledge, dexterity,

luck, wisdom, and the courage to be consumed for the sake of some
better future" [p. 23].

She adds that the involved parties should invent

the future together in an atmosphere of mutual trust.
Legal Issues
Legal considerations concerning the technical process of merger
are of major concern because of possible litigation and liability factors.
Chambers [1981a] claims that there could be more court involvement
in retrenchment mergers because this is the age of litigation.

Hample

[1982] identifies liability issues that might lead to various groups
bringing suit when campuses or programs are closed.
laid-off faculty may sue on any of three grounds:

He contends that

violation of freedom

of speech, deprivation of constitutional right of due process and
violation of contractual obligations.

He maintains that institutions

appear "to have a reasonable amount of flexibility and a good legal
defense where program closure was caused by financial exigency"
[p. 50].

He cautions, however, that such a defense can quickly

disappear if the institution's stated procedures are not followed.
Students may also bring suit on the grounds that the institution has
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violated a quasi-contractual obligation to provide instruction in return
for tuition and fees.

He recommends that institutions allow students to

voice objections (due process) and seek methods that will minimize
damage to students (phasing out programs, arranging transfer, and
merging with other programs).

O'Neill and Barnett [1980] conclude

that "courts will hold the trustees responsible for weighing all the
available options—and for documenting why they have chosen one
option rather than another" [p. 17].
Both public and private institutions of higher education exist
under various laws that regulate their operation.^

When considering a

merger, the statutes, charter and bylaws that govern each institution
must be examined.

Although laws vary from state to state, there

generally are explicit statutory procedures for amending corporate
purposes and bylaws [Meyer, 1970].

O'Neill and Barnett [1980] give an

excellent summary by state of the regulations for the closing and
merging of nonprofit colleges.
In addition to the general requirements imposed by statutes and
charters, a merger involves several technical legal issues.

As an initial

step, the institutions should identify all parties with a legal interest in
the merger.

If courts become involved in reviewing merger

agreements, they would be concerned that "all interested parties were
informed and agreed to the final outcome.

The college would have to

show that all legal obligations—including fiduciary ones—were met"
[O’Neill and Barnett, 1980, p. 29].

Benezet [1983] states that many

regional accrediting commissions have adopted policy guidelines which
suggest that the entire set of operations involving merger or closure
should be considered "a legally guided series of several steps that will
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stand up before any bar of review" [p. 39].

The legal issues in mergers

are not necessarily the most important one, but they do influence
decisions that must be made [Meyer, 1970].8
Situational Factors Impelling Merger
Given that a merger involves drastic change and is a process
requiring strong leadership and detailed planning to overcome risk,
uncertainty, liability and potential opposition including litigation over
a variety of issues, why would an institution consider such an extreme
action?

Perhaps Millett's [1976] findings based on 10 case studies

offer a possible explanation.

He concludes that the need for merger

was usually so apparent as a solution to problems and an alternative
to merger so elusive, that the merger process was consummated in
order to preserve essential educational services and opportunities.
In analyzing the literature, it appears that at least one of the
merger partners is usually under a great deal of stress due to one or
more factors.

They include financial exigency, political intervention,

concerns about quality, and limitations of access and equal
opportunity.

These factors are strong enough to propel an institution

to consider merger.
Financial
Financial exigency is identified as the most prevalent reason for a
merger [Millett, 1976; Chambers, 1981b; West, 1980; and Benezet,
1983].

Bugliarello and Urrows [1976] state that they have "yet to find

a merger that did not have as its basis a fear of what would happen if
merger did not take place" [p. 101].

They theorize that trustees are

unlikely to take the drastic act of merger unless survival is at stake.
The attractiveness of mergers for a financially struggling institution is
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that trustees view it as a reasonable way to fulfill their fiduciary
responsibilities and to provide continuity in education and
employment for students, faculty and staff [O’Neill and Barnett, 1980].
Millett [1976] found that the mergers he studied were proof of
financial difficulty in the private sector.

He hypothesized that fiscal

reasons are the essential motivation for merger.

He does not limit

fiscal reasons to immediate shortfall but includes the desire on the
part of an institution to strengthen its financial position.
The reasons why institutions find themselves in fmancial
difficulty are varied.
factor.

Millett [1976] suggests that size might be a

Small institutions in the private sector which rely on tuition

and fees as their main source of income do not share an economy of
scale that larger institutions enjoy.

Benezet [1983] and a study

conducted by the Florida Postsecondary Education Planning
Commission [1986] identified enrollment decline as a contributory’
factor to financial difficulty in institutions whose financing is
enrollment driven.

West [1980] and Benezet [1983] postulate that

poor management also contributes to financial problems.
Financial motivation for merger is not restricted to the private
sector.

In the public sector, a merger can be used to increase

resources or for retrenchment purposes resulting from reduced
financial support or declining demand.

Cass [1967], in his study of the

merger that eventually created Southeastern Massachusetts
University, found that financial benefits for the merged institution was
a major reason for the merger.

Lewis [1981] cites the merger of Newr

College and the University of South Florida as an example of howr the
state can expand programs at less cost and continue programs that
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separately might not be possible.

Although Mingle et al [1981] believe

the merging of public institutions will be rare, they maintain that
merger is one retrenchment solution to the problem of enrollment
decline and financial cutbacks.
mergers in glowing terms:

Chambers [1981a] describes public

"College merger can provide a creative and

relatively incremental means for reducing a system of higher
education to match diminished demand" [p. 1].
Although some writers consider coeducation as a reason for
merger, it appears that a financial reason is the underlying motivation
for many of these mergers.

Although social factors stemming from

sexual nondiscrimination may have contributed to five women's
colleges mergers with other institutions in the sixties, Millett [1976]
found that financial difficulty resulting from low enrollment was the
basic reason for these mergers.
It must be noted that a merger is not always the ultimate panacea
for institutions facing financial problems.

Thompson [1985] points out

that two institutions having financial difficulty should not merge
because the successor institution will most likely struggle also.

The

recent closing due to financial difficulty of Mercer University's College
of Arts and Sciences, acquired in a 1972 merger, is a case in point
["Mercer's College," 1990].

Bugliarello and Urrows [1976] maintain that

trustees take the drastic act of merger "with reluctance, only when
they see salvation or an enormous advantage.
marginal they will not risk merger" [p. 112].

When gains are
O'Neill and Barnett [1980]

caution that to a small, financially struggling college "the reality of
merger may turn out to be less attractive than surface appearances
would warrant" [p. 25].
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The second situational factor that propels an institution into a
merger is political intervention.

Mergers involving public institutions

have by their very nature political implications.

A classic example is

presented by the merger of the University of Wisconsin and the
Wisconsin State University Systems where the governor was the prime
mover for the merger.

Then Governor Patrick J. Lucey pushed the

merger through the legislature despite opposition from educational
boards, administrators and faculty, and public indifference [Shaw,
1973].

His stated motivation to the voters was that the state was

experiencing "days of austerity" and that the merger would "save the
taxpayers money" [Shaw, 1973, p. 40].
The merger of three institutions located in the nation's capital into
the University of the District of Columbia also illustrates the influence
of politics.

Gordon [1976] uses strong language by claiming that "old-

fashioned power politics" had been involved in the university's
creation [p. 22].

She claims that the original merger bill, largely

written by the president of one of the institutions, would have reduced
the other principal institution involved to a very subordinate role in
the merged institution.

Political reasons played a different role in the

merger of two institutions with strong local ties to the cities in which
#).

they were located into what is now Southeastern Massachusetts
University.

According to Cass [1967], a major reason contributing to

the merger was the desire to escape the local political domination and
patronage that existed at the predecessor institutions.
In Millett's study [1976], political considerations were a major
influence in four instances.9

In each case the mergers resulted from

strong efforts by politicians in the local area and a favorable political
climate in state government.

Millett concludes that:

It is reasonable to generalize that any merger involving
state government funding or state government legislative
action is necessarily a merger made possible only by
political considerations involving the various parties
to the transaction. Governmental action is politics and
mergers of higher education institutions sometimes can
and do involve governmental action, [pp. 22-23]
Another aspect of political intervention is the desire on the part
of public officials to use mergers to correct the lack of coordination
among institutions.

In the proposed 1979 reorganization of two-year

colleges in Alabama, mergers were recommended because the current
system had been developed with little thought to coordination and
planning [Mingle, et al, 1981].

In Connecticut the proposal to merge

community colleges with technical colleges was based on the premise
that it would enhance the coordination of curriculum [Mingle, et al].

In

Massachusetts, the same writers found that the absence of a strong
statewide coordinating mechanism contributed to the merger of Boston
State College and the University of Massachusetts at Boston.
One of the reasons given for the merger creating a single
University of Wisconsin system was to eliminate the weak
Coordinating Council for Higher Education [Shaw, 1973].

Evidently the

council was unable to eliminate unnecessary duplication and
competition.
problem.

Merger was seen by its proponents as a way to solve this

Governor Lucey particularly singled out the "expensive

duplication of graduate programs in both systems" as one of the
reasons for merger [Shaw, p. 40].

In Florida, the primary reasons cited

by the Legislature in directing a study to be done on forming a single

public four-year institution with multiple campuses was "the
development of a structure for ensuring coordination and the delivery
of educational opportunities" [Florida Commission, 1986, p. i].10
It is interesting to note that Mingle, et al [1981] predicted that the
merging and closing of public institutions during the 1980s would be
rare because of political constraints.

They base this conclusion on the

premise that institutions and their supporters go to great extremes to
avoid mergers and closings, thereby making the political costs too high.
This prediction is validated by Jaschik [1987] who reports that citizen
campaigns made it nearly impossible to close or merge public
institutions in the 1980s.

Even when only one of the institutions is

public, the political debate can be difficult and acrimonious [Bogue,
1981].

Mingle and his associates suggest that one solution to keeping

politics out of the consideration is "to provide greater incentives for
campuses or systems to engage in serious self-contraction" [p. 296].* 1
They further state that any public institution considering merger will
need to obtain firm gubernatorial support.
Quality

Improvement

The need to improve the quality of programs or enhance
academic excellence is a third situational factor that moves an
institution to consider a merger.

Thompson [1970] maintains that

"breadth, depth, accreditation and enrichment of academic programs
may all be promoted by a merger" [p. 4-96].

He concludes that when

specialized schools merge with larger institutions, students benefit
from greater faculty competence in a large number of fields.

This

level of competence could not be attained by the smaller school.

He

also claims that larger departments offer a greater variety of courses
and permit a higher degree of specialization.
The merger that created Case Western Reserve University
illustrates the improved academic quality of the succeeding institution.
Fischer [1978] states that the motivation for the merger was "to bring
into being a nationally recognized community of academic excellence"
[p. 38].

She concluded 11 years after the merger that it has worked

successfully and the institution is thriving.

A similar note has recently

been sounded in the Kansas Board of Regents' approval of the merger
of Kansas State University and the Kansas College of Technology.

The

merger has been described as "not only a move of economy but an
enhancement of quality" [Cage, 1990].
In the study by Millett [1976], the drive for academic excellence
was a motivational factor in four cases.

In each of these cases it was

anticipated that academic excellence would be more readily brought
about and sustained than if the institution had not merged. * 2

Martin

and Samels [1989] claim that a new perspective on mergers is
emerging.

It is one of moving away from the usual focus of managing

decline to a view that mergers are creative and effective means to
achieve academic excellence by improving quality.

An example of this

is the recently considered merger of the University of Baltimore and
the University of Maryland-Baltimore County in which the proponents
argued that it would improve the quality of public higher education
[Jaschik, 1990a].
Access and Equal Opportunity
A final reason for a merger involves providing equal access for
minorities and the desegregation of institutions.

In a significant
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decision, the United State's Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in 1979
that the utilization of merger was a viable strategy for accomplishing
desegregation in higher education.

The court action mandated the

merger of the University of Tennessee at Nashville, a predominately
white institution into Tennessee State University, a predominately
black institution.

This was the first case of a court-ordered merger

resulting in the surviving institution being a predominately black
institution [Matlock and Humphries, 1979].

In studying this merger,

Matlock and Humphries observe that some states, in considering ways
to desegregate their dual systems of higher education, view merging
black schools into white ones as possible, and often times the only
solution.

They claim that the merging of white institutions into black

institutions is rarely mentioned even though some of the black schools
have been functioning much longer.
The implementation of mergers to effect desegregation may be
considered by the states of Mississippi and Alabama.

In February

1990, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that
Mississippi operates an illegally segregated university system of five
predominately white universities and three historically black
universities ["Mississippi Must Desegregate," 1990].

Alabama is

currently facing legal action involving desegregation of its colleges
[Jaschik, 1990b].

Mingle et al [1981] cautions, however, that black

colleges will strongly fight merger in order to retain their identities.
They cite experiences in Maryland in 1979 and Alabama in 1980 when
"supporters of the black colleges filled the meeting rooms to
overflowing and provided enough opposition so that the
proposals...were dropped or postponed" [Mingle et al, 1981, p. 295].

Other Reasons for Merger
In addition to the above stated factors impelling institutions to
seek merger, several other facilitation factors are identified in the
literature.

They include previous cooperation, geographical proximity

and program/mission changes.
When institutions have had a history of collaborating on
various projects and programs, the decision to merge their entire
operation may be facilitated.

Millett [1976] details four instances

where collaboration was present prior to merger.

He cites the

cooperation of Case Institute of Technology and Western Reserve
University as a prime example of how collaboration facilitated the
merger discussion.

Fischer [1978] colorfully illustrates the role of this

collaboration by quoting the President of Western Reserve:

"'We’ve

been going steady for about 10 years; we've been sleeping together for
about 5 years—and its about time we got married'" [p. 39].
Cooperation between institutions as a facilitation factor has also been
documented by Chambers [1981b] and Thompson [1985].
Millett [1976] observes that because cooperation between
institutions has its own advantages, it does not necessarily mean
an intention to merge.

He does, however, identify a pattern of

cooperation as "a positive influence encouraging an eventual merger of
two institutions" [p. 18].

He theorizes that the process of cooperation

may be so troublesome that both parties view merger as preferable to
the complication of continued joint action.

If this is not the case, he

postulates that merger may be viewed by the institutions as the logical
sequel of cooperation and increased collaboration.
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The geographical location of institutions in relationship to each
other can also facilitate merger.

In Millett's 1976 study,

geographical proximity played a principal role.

Thompson [1970]

maintains that if other things are equal, "a merger is more likely to
take place between two adjacent institutions than between two that
are geographically separate" [p. 4-29].

Geographic factors, however,

are not limited to the mere fact of proximity.
from

Millett maintains that

1945 to 1970, state governments and state universities reversed

their earlier stance of locating institutions away from the emerging
concentrations of urban population.

He found that "some part of the

story of mergers is a story of this adjustment of public higher
education to the realities of a predominately urban society with a
variety of ethnic populations" [p. 14]. 13

Chambers [1981b], Myers

[1990], and Mangan [1990] also identify the desire of public
institutions to expand into a particular geographical area as a reason
for merger.
A merger may also be appealing to institutions in order to expand
academic programs that complement rather than duplicate current
course offerings.

Chambers [1981b] maintains that institutions may be

amenable to a merger in order to "expand their programming and
diversify their activities so that they are less vulnerable to shifts in
demands for particular programs" [p. 92].

She also suggests that

institutions with research orientations may seek a merger with
professional schools in order to counteract the uncertainties of federal
support.

Conversely, schools with high quality professional programs

might seek a merger with research institutions to gain research or
enrollment

potential.
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It is possible that differences in programs of two institutions may
facilitate a merger more than institutions with similar programs.
Millett [1976] concluded that "to some degree, complementary
institutional programs rather than duplicated or competing programs
appeared to encourage mergers" [p. 19].

This contention is also

supported by Cannon [1983] and Bugliarello and Urrows [1976].

The

latter postulate that dissimilar and complementary mergers involve
less tension than those joining similar institutions and therefore are
more likely to occur.
The motivation to merge, however, is not restricted to
diversification of programs.

The desire to lessen competition and

eliminate duplication is also a motivating factor.

In the Wisconsin

merger, Shaw [1973] claims that part of the contributing reason was to
end unnecessary duplication and competition.

In the recent merger of

the University of Detroit and Mercy College, the elimination of
duplicate programs and the saving of money were given as reasons for
the consolidation ["Two Catholic Colleges," 1990]. Some argue that the
solidification of a strategic position in a local or regional market is a
valid reason to merge [Martin and Samels, 1989].
Closely intertwined with program factors is the issue of
institutional mission.

If an institution wishes to change its mission,

merging with another college to create an entirely new institution is an
alternative.

Martin and Samels [1989] contend that merger is one of

the most creative and effective means for academic planners to
articulate new missions.

They cite as a pertinent example the merger

of Widener University (small university), the Delaware Law School and
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Brandywine College (a junior college) into one full-service regional
university. 1 4
The Outcomes of Merger
The literature indicates that most mergers accomplish many of
the original purposes for which the process was initiated.

This

positive outcome, however, comes at a price for the institution and the
people involved.

As stated earlier, institutional identity of at least one

participant is lost and faculty, students and alumni are adversely
affected in various ways.

Because of this, merger could be described

as bitter medicine to facilitate a better future.
[1976] state it graphically:

Bugliarello and Urrows

"The aftermath of an academic merger is

like having all your teeth out.

When we look back at what has

happened, long after the novocaine has worn off, the gains may well
be worth the pains" [p. 95].
When the main reason for a merger is financial exigency, the
merger usually results in creating a successor institution with a degree
of financial stability.

In a survey of 31 mergers over a nine-year

period, it was found that improved financial support was the most
frequent advantage of merger [Peters, 1977].

In the study conducted

by Millett [1976] both financial improvement and payment of
creditors resulted from those mergers where financial exigency was
a factor.
A merger involving a financially troubled institution, however,
does not automatically ensure financial stability for the successor
institution.

If both institutions have deficit operations, their joining is

likely to compound rather than solve their problems [Bugliarello and
Urrows, 1976].

Gorman and Pappas [1989] warn that lasting economy

of scale is not necessarily the case in all mergers.

Also, the lack of

potential financial savings could scuttle merger efforts.

This, along

with the potential decrease of community support resulting from a loss
of identity, were cited as reasons why the proposed merger between
Florida Atlantic University and Florida International University was
not consummated [Florida Commission, 1986].

The Florida Commission

in fact concluded that most public mergers result in additional
expenses because of added bureaucracy and increased state spending
to appease disgruntled constituencies.
In addition to improved financial status, other positive effects of
merger have been documented.

The merger of New College and the

University of South Florida resulted in New College continuing its
identity through a flexible, individualized and freedom of choice
program of studies [Scheuerle, 1979].

Improvement in quality of

instructional programs, enrollment increase and campus expansion
were present in varying degrees in the mergers studied by Millett
[1976].

In Peters' survey [1977], improved or elimination of duplicate

programs was identified by twelve institutions as a positive outcome
of merger.
Alternatives to Merger
Because a merger is a complex process that involves high risk
and negative impacts on individuals, alternatives should be given
consideration.

Mergers are not the only means available to achieve

strategic objectives of a merger [Gorman and Pappas, 1989].

Within

the literature, identified alternatives range along a continuum from
management changes within an institution to cooperative efforts with
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other institutions to the drastic measure of closure.

This section will

briefly discuss these alternatives.
Internal

Changes

For institutions facing financial exigency, several alternatives
involving internal action exist to improve its fiscal position and
thereby avoid a merger.

They basically center on the actions of

increasing revenue, decreasing costs and implementing management
changes.

They include raising tuition and expanding only on the basis

of tuition [Thompson, 1970], pursuing more aggressive investments to
gain a higher rate of return on endowment [Grassmuck, 1990],
maximizing the use of facilities [Vecchione, 1981], and down-sizing of
programs and staff [McIntyre, 1990 and Grassmuck, 1990].

Other

management techniques include the development of market strategies
for recruiting students and the implementation of strategic planning,
which involves systematically setting goals and formulating plans
for achieving them [Grassmuck, 1990].

Institutions could also become

more efficient by being more management conscious and utilizing
information systems and technology to perform their functions
[McIntyre,

1990].

A more radical approach to financial problems involves changing
the mission of the institution or its form of control.

Vecchione [1981]

states that institutions wanting to implement innovative programs to
increase enrollment and income may have to change the personality of
the school and its mission.

In the 1970s, New York University took the

drastic step of restructuring its mission to survive financial problems
[Baldridge, 1977].

McKeefery [1981] in his study of five private

institutions which entered into public partnership by accepting state

funding, found positive outcomes even though crises were often the
trigger for the change.

He found that although governance is altered,

organization revised, accountability instituted and service to a
particular public mandated, "institutional self-determination is
still a large component of these private-public partnerships" [p. 64].
Thompson [1970] and O’Neill and Barnett [1980] also see public
funding as a way of solving financial problems.
Cooperative Measures
Various forms of cooperative arrangements can be entered into
by an institution in order to improve quality, lower costs and expand
opportunity.

Voluntary cooperation, sometimes referred to as

affiliation, enables institutions to establish reciprocal arrangements
that are characterized by a less formalized structure than other forms
of cooperation [Cannon, 1983].

Under this type of agreement. Cannon

points out that the identities, charters, powers and corporate
structures of affiliated institutions remain intact.

Staff from two or

more institutions working together on a particular project is a basic
example of this type of cooperation.

Bugliarello and Urrows [1976]

add that affiliation is the loosest cooperative arrangement and it is
"a linkage that lasts only as long as both parties benefit" [p. 99].
The next highest level of cooperation is consortium.

Cannon

[1983] describes it as an arrangement in which "institutions join
together to formally share programs, services, facilities, students and
staff" [p. 3].

Under this arrangement, participating institutions have

formal agreements while maintaining separate corporate identity.
Five College Consortium involving the University of Massachusetts,
Amherst and nearby colleges is an example of this arrangement.

The

Patterson [1974] lists the advantages of consortia as increasing
diversity, quality of programs and scope of services, while decreasing
costs.

O'Neill and Barnett [1980] maintain, however, that consortia are

unlikely to be the answer to severe financial or management
difficulties because members assume financial responsibility for only
those activities that are specified in the joint venture agreement.
The highest level of cooperation is federation.

Under this

arrangement, two or more institutions "retain their corporate identities
but agree to surrender to a central administration, a measure of
autonomy in the overall management of the combined institution"
[O'Neill and Barnett, 1980, p. 18].

According to O'Neill and Barnett, it is

in theory a compact among equals that tends to work best where
institutions complement rather than duplicate each other's
programs.* ^
Termination
There exists at least two rather drastic options to cooperation and
merger.

They are bankruptcy and closure.

Vecchione [1981] states

that historically bankruptcy has been viewed incorrectly as a criminal
act.

He maintains that it can be a valuable tool for a troubled

institution to gain needed time to regroup and reorganize.

He

concludes that the filing of a Chapter 11 "can bring into one proceeding
all of the problems that need attention and resolution.

The protection

of the court affords the institution the time and opportunity to address
all of its problems and to develop a cohesive plan for resolving them"
[p. 14].

O'Neill and Barnett [1980] conclude that although Chapter 11 is

seldom used, it is most appropriate when an institution has sufficient
non-liquid assets to make a successful reorganization likely.

When an institution can not negotiate a merger or institute
one of the options identified in this section, closing becomes the only
option if it is unable to operate in the black.

Closing has been

described as "a painful, difficult, and certainly the most final of all
types of corporate change” [O'Neill and Barnett, 1980, p. 55].

Millett

[1976] found that "the closing of a college presented even more
sensitive issues than those involved in a merger.

One reason for this

sensitivity is that a closing is very likely to result in litigation" [p. 72].
He found that in the five closings studied, an income-expenditure gap
was the immediate cause of closure, each lacked an endowment of any
size, and management circumstances of each college contributed to
eventual failure.

He argues that business failures are a common

phenomenon and there is no reason why such failures may not also
occur in higher education.

Sil-mmary
A merger, by its very nature, is a drastic change for participating
institutions, their governing boards and constituencies.

Institutional

changes include dissolution of boards of trustees, alteration of mission
and programs, and modification of organization and procedures.

These

changes occur whether the merger is of the consolidation type (all
boards replaced by a new one) or the dissolution/acquisition type (one
board takes over other boards).

During the 1970s, this latter type of

merger has replaced the consolidation type as the most common.
Under both types of merger, one institution usually takes a
dominant role because of reputation, size, financial condition or
other factors.

This is especially true when a private institution

mergers with a public one.

The dominance of the public institution
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resulting in loss of autonomy for the private entity may be one reason
why mergers between private institutions are more readily
accomplished that between mixed control institutions.
A merger has a dramatic impact on faculty, staff, students and
alumni.
change.

It is a stressful situation that employees view as a major life
This triggers resistance, anger, resentment, anxiety, decreased

job satisfaction, role tension and low morale.

The situation is further

exacerbated when employees consider themselves as belonging to the
less dominant institution.

Therefore, organizational culture and

transitional stress should be addressed.
benefit from business merger experience.
are also disrupted.

In this regard institutions can
In many instances students

Alumni also feel a sense of loss accentuated by

their loyalty to alma mater.
A merger is a complex, time consuming and difficult process
that involves negotiation and detailed planning. Problems may be so
idiosyncratic that each merger must be hand-tailored.

Negotiation is

often characterized by secrecy, difficulty in arranging transfer of
faculty and staff, and concern over institutional reputation and
financial risk.

Faculty and staff status is usually the most difficult and

major obstacle in the process.

Leadership, strategic planning,

involvement of constituencies, and emphasis on positive outcomes are
necessary for successful mergers.
surface during the process.

Unexpected issues will undoubtedly

Because of the complex nature of the

merger process, liability litigation on behalf of faculty and students is
a distinct possibility.

If litigation occurs, courts will examine if

trustees considered all options and the reasons why they choose a
merger over other options.

Despite the complexity and difficulty of the process, mergers
have been consummated either to attain a greater good or to alleviate
situational factors that threaten the educational enterprise.

In the

latter case, there must be a clear gain for participating institutions.

In

the 1960s, expansion and growth were prime motives for mergers.

In

the 1970s, the main force was financial exigency.

It appears that in

the 1980s, there is a combination of financial exigency and
improvement of quality as a major cause.
Political intervention for fiscal reasons and to improve
coordination has also been a merger impelling factor.

The mergers of

public institutions imposed by state authorities, however, may be
rare because constituents of institutions who are opposed go to the
extreme, making political cost too high.

Another reason for mergers is

that mission and programs can be expanded by merging institutions
with complimentary rather than duplicative curriculum.

For public

institutions, the elimination of duplication to save money may be
major reasons for merger, especially if they are in proximity to each
other.

Quality and access can also be enhanced by a merger.

In the

latter case, however, the loss of identity for black colleges may be a
major obstacle.
Although mergers usually accomplish their intended purposes,
especially in cases of financial exigency on the part of one partner,
alternatives should be considered given the complexity, risks and
negative impacts of the process.

They include internal

management changes and reforms, changes in mission and type of
control, voluntary cooperation with other institutions, consortia,
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federation and bankruptcy.

For some institutions with severe financial

problems, closure may be the only option.
The literature, however, does not provide answers to several
important questions concerning the merger phenomenon.

Exactly how

does organizational change affect the reasons, process and outcomes
associated with a merger?

What are the specific causes of conflict and

crisis characteristic of the merger process?

And finally, are there

ways in which the merger process can be facilitated to lessen the
negative outcomes for the institution and involved individuals?

An

examination of case studies of specific mergers will help to answer
these questions and identify important distinctions.

The analysis is

presented according to the merger reasons (Chapter 2), process
(Chapter 3), and outcomes (Chapter 4).

47

Notes
1

Chambers [1983] identifies two additional but less common types
of merger: interlocking directorate and holding corporation. In
the interlocking directorate arrangement, members of one board
of trustees resign and are replaced by members of the board of
another institution. This was used in the merger between
Parson's School of Design and New School of Social Science in
1970. In the holding corporation model, a separate board is
created that controls the existing boards of the institutions
involved in a merger. The existing boards continue, but with
limited and well defined responsibilities.

2

Some writers draw an analogy between merger and death.
Thompson [1985] states that the reactions and attitudes
among the constituents of an institution about to lose its
identity are comparable to the symptoms of grief exhibited
over the death of a human being. For O'Neill and Barnett
[1980], the psychological impact of merger is comparable to
death with its sequence of denial, anger, bargaining, depression
and acceptance. West concludes that persons "associated with an
institution facing merger or closure suffer the same symptoms of
grief they would experience over the loss of anything important"
[p. 28].

3

Bennis [1977] points out that problems surrounding change are
not peculiar to universities. He states, "Every modern
bureaucracy-university, government or corporation—is
essentially alike and responds similarly to challenge and to crisis,
with much the same explicit codes, punctilios and mystiques"
[p. 121].

4

Academic mergers differ from business mergers in at least two
important ways. Academic mergers are less restrictive in that
there are no anti-trust laws involved and no fear of an injunction
on the basis of restraint of trade and reduction of competition
[Thompson, 1970]. Also, academic mergers usually involve one
institution being in an inferior position resulting in the joining
a viable with a non-viable institution. This is usually not the case
in business mergers [Benezet, 1983].

5

Steiner [1975] also identifies threats to managerial status as a
detriment to business mergers.
Like academic mergers, he states
that business mergers have a variety of motivations and varied
effects. He concludes that guidelines ought to be established that
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will enable companies to determine if a merger should be
entered into and that attention must be given to probable
alternatives to merger.
6

The concern of faculty members relative to merger is articulated
by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). In
a statement issued in 1981, the Association put forth two
requirements: First, faculty should be involved in decisions
affecting academic programs and faculty status. Second, terms of
faculty appointment at the time of affiliation be honored as fully
as possible and the principles of academic freedom and tenure be
safeguarded.

7

Public institutions operate under enabling general education
legislation or specific statutes passed by state legislatures.
Private institutions operate under nonprofit corporation acts of
each state and degree approval requirements of various boards.
Meyer [1970] points out that a merged institution must seek
approval to grant degrees from the appropriate authority in
the state and must follow state requirements in changing name
and/or location of the institution.

8

Other legal concerns concerning the technical parts of merger
include corporate powers of governing boards, transfer of assets,
incorporation of governing board, corporate legislative and/or
judicial approval, labor contracts, contracts with vendors, leases,
merger agreement document, disposition of physical property,
and transfer of accounts receivable and payable [Meyer, 1970;
Thompson, 1985; Chambers, 1981b].

9

The mergers were Suny/Buffalo, University of Missouri/Kansas
City, New York University/Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn,
and Lowell State College/Lowell Technological Institute.

10

The study commission, however, concluded that mergers between
public institutions are rare and difficult particularly if impetus
comes from the state.

11

They identify the retaining of savings by the institution (as
opposed to reversion to the state) as one incentive. With this
incentive, the desired outcomes could then be achieved on a
voluntary basis with programs and plans being formulated by the
educational community.
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12

He concludes that "Without this motivation for excellence, merger
would have been much more difficult for faculty members to
accept...[it] was a purpose faculty members could not resist" [p.

21].
13

The merger of the University of Kansas City with the University of
Missouri system, the University of Buffalo with the State
University of New York, and the School of Engineering and Science
of New York University with the Polytechnic Institute of
Brooklyn are cited as examples of public institutions moving into
urban areas through mergers.

14

It is also possible that the mission may remove an institution
from a consideration of merger as a viable alternative. This is
illustrated by a recent merger attempt in Michigan. Citing its
unique role for the people of Detroit, Marygrove College has
recently withdrawn from a plan to merge with the University of
Detroit and Mercy College [Marygrove Withdraws, 1990]. West
[1980] argues that if the distinctive quality of the institution’s
mission is declining in importance and the environmental
setting has low potential, then closure rather than merger is
almost inevitable.

15

To this definition, Cannon [1983] adds arrangements where
institutions create subcolleges within a large organization.
Under
this arrangement, the subunits share resources, lower
operating costs and reduce areas of duplication while gaining
greater identity and autonomy in terms of name, programs,
faculty and facilities. The Cluster Colleges of Claremont
College in California are an example of federation. Each college is
autonomous, but they share many academic programs and
facilities and have a centralized planning and coordinating
mechanism.

CHAPTER 2
REASONS FOR THE MERGERS
The literature identifies financial exigency, greater coordination,
previous cooperation, program changes and quality improvement as
reasons why institutions merge.

By analyzing the 18 case studies

(listed in Appendix A), it is possible to identify certain pressures on
the institutions that underlie the reasons for a merger.

For the private

institutions, the pressures include trying to maintain a particular
purpose in the face of changing conditions.

For the public institutions,

there is the pressure from external bodies for greater educational
opportunity and accountability.

These underlying pressures are

identified and elaborated upon in the first two sections of this chapter,
one dealing with private institutions and the other public institutions.
Important distinctions are then presented when this analysis is
compared with the literature.

The chapter concludes with an

interpretation of the findings that identifies common elements and a
fundamental tension between forces for change and stability.
Financial Exigency in the Private Sector
Seven of the mergers studied involved private institutions.

In all

cases, one of the partners faced financial exigency so severe that a
merger was the only viable alternative to closing. 1

In addition to

being private institutions, each college shared other characteristics—
low enrollment, limited programs, small endowments and management
difficulties—all of which contributed to their financial predicament.
The case of Milwaukee-Downer College is typical of the others and will

be briefly described to illustrate the crisis and the causative factors
that led to merger.
Milwaukee-Downer College was a small liberal arts institution
for women that was experiencing serious financial difficulty for a
number of years.

Over those years, the college incurred increasing

deficits due mainly to declining enrollments.

The loss of students was

primarily due to the college's steadfastness to remaining a liberal arts
college and a single sex institution in spite of changing market
demand.

This situation was exacerbated by competition from a nearby

rapidly expanding public institution, the University of WisconsinMilwaukee.

The main response of the president and trustees to

mounting problems was to change admission plans and staff and to
increase fund-raising activities.

When these attempts failed to solve

the problem and the college's small endowment was being eroded, the
trustees faced a major financial crisis.

Rejecting the alternatives of

coeducation and interinstitutional cooperation with the nearby public
university, the trustees decided to sell its property to the public
university and merge with another private institution in order to
avoid dissolution.
The situation of the other six private institutions involved in this
study is much the same.

Names, places and some details change, but

the central theme of financial stress resulting mainly from low
enrollment remains the same.

In analyzing the data of these mergers,

two additional significant factors stand out.
problems within the administrative sphere.

The first factor involves
In most cases, fiscal

management and decision making left something to be desired.

At

Milwaukee-Downer, the trustees did not exercise budget authority to

avoid deficits [Howard, 1980].

This was also true at Parsons School of

Design where Levy [1979] describes the trustees as sanguine
concerning deficits and concludes that rudimentary principles of
management and solutions to financial problems seem to have been
ignored.

Management problems at Barrington College took the form of

a leadership vacuum created by five different chief executive officers
in a span of seven years prior to merger [Winfrey, 1989].

Detroit

College of Business was denied accreditation just prior to seeking
merger because its planning process was not continuous nor related to
budgeting procedures [Brown, 1987].
A second significant factor which led these private institutions to
merger was the presence of a steadfastness of purpose.
different forms at the various colleges.

This took

For Barrington College and

Western College, it manifested itself in faith in the deity to deliver
these quasi-church related institutions from their financial difficulties
so that their specialized mission could continue.

New College and

Milwaukee-Downer College consistently refused to change their high
cost, low demand program in order to continue their special
contribution to higher education.

Parsons School of Design rejected

establishing a Bachelor of Fine Arts until it was too late to save itself
financially because the program might dilute its current curricula.

In

the end, all seven institutions selected merger over dissolution in
order to try to continue their heritage and specialized mission.

This is

made very clear in the Barrington College merger where Winfrey
[1989] concludes:

Certainly if Barrington could find another institution of
a similar philosophy willing to enter into a merger
agreement, then the mission of the college could continue
to be fulfilled. Indeed, closing the college would have meant
that Barrington's mission would have ceased to exist as an
option for like-minded individuals considering attendance at a
higher education institution,
[pp. 251-52]
There is a certain irony that the very steadfastness which
contributed to financial difficulty became the motivation to accept a
merger and reject dissolution.

This steadfastness of purpose will also

play a role in the process of merger to be discussed in Chapter 3.

The

question of whether these institutions were successful in perpetuating
their mission will be examined in Chapter 4.
In some of the cases, internal financial problems were
exacerbated by external forces over which the institution had no
control.

Competition for students brought about by rapidly expanding

public institutions in the same locality as small private institutions
contributed to the decline in enrollment driven revenues for at least
two institutions involved in this study.

For Milwaukee-Downer

College, the nearby University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee with its lower
cost and program variety seriously competed for students and eroded
the college's local base, forcing it to seek out-of-state students.

For

Owen College, the impact of the expansion of the Tennessee community
college system was more pronounced.

The president of Owen is

quoted as succinctly describing the expansion as "the death knell of
Owen College, because we will not be able to compete...at the
operational level or at the capital level" [Searcy, 1981, p. 54].
Given the very grave financial condition of these seven colleges,
why would any other institution enter into a merger with them?

Two
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case studies may give some insight on this question.

New School of

Social Research, a private liberal arts institution, was sought as a
merger partner for the troubled Parsons School of Design.

Although

Parsons had no endowment, owned no buildings and possessed
insufficient funds to finish the fiscal year, New School agreed to a
merger.

The administration of New School was in an expansion mode

and viewed merger with Parsons as an opportunity to expand its
educational and philosophical position, to become larger for optimum
size for administrative efficiency and to diversify its programs to
counter changing market trends [Levy, 1979].

Levy concluded that

New School officials determined that Parsons' problems were
administrative, not educational, and could be solved by tuition
increase, cost reduction through consolidation, and increased
fund-raising from professional and industrial ties which New
School did not have.

The attractiveness of Parsons is underscored by

New School's rejection about the same time of a merger offer from
Mills College of Education.

The administration of New School judged

Mills to be not viable financially nor educationally [Levy].

Clearly New

School saw a financial gain in incorporating Parsons' programs into its
offerings.
A similar gain was the motivation for Miami University (Ohio), a
public institution, to take over nearby Western College, a private
institution in severe financial difficulty.

According to an analysis by

Kennedy [1975], Miami saw an opportunity to increase its book value
by obtaining Western's land and buildings at a bargain price.

It feared

that if Western went into bankruptcy, its land would be put to
undesirable use.

Also, the merger would generate additional revenue

from the state and students.

Aside from direct financial gain, it was

thought that Miami's national reputation would be enhanced by
providing a model for the taking over a small liberal arts college.

The

only educational gain identified by Kennedy was that Miami would
diversify its curriculum by incorporating a program for testing
innovative ideas.

For Miami, the main gain was directly financial.

Further insight on why an institution would enter into a merger
with a troubled institution can be gained from a study conducted
by Deubell [1984].

Based on a survey of educational leaders, he

concluded that few problems will deter merger on the part of a
healthier institution when it recognizes that a long-term need will be
met and a type of economy will be gained.

The existence of high fixed

cost was identified as a major impediment to a merger.

Of the

fourteen major impediments identified by the respondents, eleven
dealt with economic factors.2

The remaining three issues dealt with

quality (accreditation, image and retrenchment affecting quality).

The

financial factors which create problems for an institution may very
well hinder its efforts to obtain a satisfactory remedy through a
merger.
Public Policy Issues in the Public Sector
In examining the case studies of the mergers of public
institutions, it is clear that the reasons for merger are far more
complex than the financial exigency that propelled the mergers of
private institutions.

Part of the reason for this is the added

involvement of coordinating boards, legislators and governors in the
decision-making process.

The political system within which public

institutions operate contributes an extra dimension that private
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institutions do not have to contend with.

Even though public and

private institutions share the common educational goal of the
advancement and dissemination of knowledge through instruction and
research, how they administer the process differs greatly.

Public

policy addressing issues of educational opportunity, efficiency and
accountability which influences public institutions is in sharp contrast
to the independence of action afforded trustees and presidents of
private institutions.

The ultimate locus of control for a public

institution is external to the campus, whereas in the private sector it is
internal to the institution.
Public policy issues certainly played a pivotal role in effectuating
the mergers of public institutions examined in this study.3

The desire

of public officials, external to the institution, to increase efficiency and
expand educational opportunity by merging public institutions is
distinctly different than the merger motives of private institutions
facing financial exigency.

A description of the much studied merger

creating the University of Wisconsin System [Carothers, 1974; Heim,
1976; and Buchanan, 1977] is presented to illustrate the role of public
officials and their use of a merger to attain both efficiency and
expanded

educational

opportunity.

Prior to 1971, Wisconsin had two separate university systems-the University of Wisconsin system and the State University of
Wisconsin system.

Each system had its own board of trustees and

a number of campuses located throughout the state.

During the

period 1897-1969, merger bills were introduced in 23 of the 38
legislative sessions held during that period [Carothers, 1974].
The only two bills to pass created a coordinating board and staff
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with limited powers.

The pattern of external political involvement

was well established when newly elected Governor Patrick Lucey filed
legislation in 1970 to merge the two systems.

In introducing the

legislation, Lucey focused on efficiency and egalitarian aspects of
educational opportunity [Heim, 1976].

The efficiency to be gained

from merger would be the limiting of unchecked competition between
the two systems and the saving of administrative funds by
consolidating three boards and staffs into one [Heim].

The governor's

emphasis was not so much on saving money but on the maximum
utilization of funds to ensure the highest quality [Carothers].

This led

to his other stated motivation to end the inequities in funding between
the two systems and to abolish the discrimination between the two
degrees [Carothers].

The first objective actually stated in the bill

dwells on this egalitarian aspect:

"A unified system of collegiate

education will foster greater diversity in educational opportunity..."
[Buchanan, 1977, p. 2].
To understand why a merger would redress the problems of
inefficiency and inequity, the causative factors need to be examined.
Certainly the rapid growth of both systems with new campuses being
added during the period 1950-70 led to competition and duplication
[Buchanan, 1977].

As indicated by Buchanan, every four-year

institution in the state wanted to be like the University of WisconsinMadison.

She described the two systems as having a "long history of

internecine warfare" [p. 1].

In an attempt to control this situation,

elected officials created a coordinating board several years before
merger took place.

This action failed to solve the problem because the

board had no real power to enforce decisions, no constituency, and a
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membership drawn from the two systems [Buchanan, 1977].

Faced

with continuing rivalry and spiraling costs, elected officials turned to
merger as a solution to inefficiency and inequity.
All three case studies on the Wisconsin merger clearly indicate
that the governor provided the impetus for the merger proposal.

With

the merger proposal coming from an external source, what was the
reaction from the higher education community?

Carothers [1974]

reported that most of the higher education establishment was against
merger.

He identified the concern of opponents that the merger would

homogenize the system by leveling peaks of excellence and destroying
diversity.

The University of Wisconsin-Madison faculty feared the

deterioration of quality, loss of prestige and faculty control, and
infringement of academic freedom.

Opponents within the State

University system claimed that the merger would lead to a
deterioration of teaching excellence within the system.

The loss of

special missions of individual campuses and local autonomy were also
identified as concerns.
Given this division of the governor proposing the merger in the
name of equal opportunity and efficiency and the higher education
establishment opposing it on the grounds of autonomy and excellence,
the legislature was faced with the final decision.

Would it vote the

merger down as it had done so many times before?

Heim [1976] in his

detailed study of the legislative deliberations on the issue sheds some
light on why the merger bill passed.

First and foremost he credits the

governor's initiative, perseverance and judicious use of power and
influence as a key reason for passage of the bill.

Members of the

legislature saw the merger as a way to eliminate dickering between
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the two systems, to lessen competition and the lobbying for funds, and
to establish better legislative control.

Their displeasure with the

performance of the coordinating board was also a factor favoring the
merger.
Circumstances in the state and on the campuses also created a
favorable environment for the merger in the minds of the legislators.
Heim [1976] maintains that conservatives did not like the University
of Wisconsin-Madison because of the riots, demonstrations and
permissive attitudes toward radicalism.

Carothers [1974] identifies a

commitment to, and emphasis on, austerity coupled with rapidly rising
budget requests as contributing strongly to merger.

He also cited the

pragmatic reality that campus unrest cost the University of Wisconsin
political clout and public support.

Because of little public interest in

the merger, he concludes that the issue was of little interest to
legislators.
public's ire.

Passage of the merger bill would not raise the general
Buchanan [1977] found general public indifference to the

specific issue of merger, but a desire on the part of citizens to save
money.

Perhaps this influenced Governor Lucey's statement at the

passage of the implementation bill that the merger not only meant
better education but savings for each taxpayer.
Further insight on the dichotomous relationship between
external and internal positions on merger of public institutions
can be gained from Zekan's study [1990] of four mergers that took
place in Massachusetts.^

In the Southeastern Massachusetts

merger, the then Governor Foster Furcolo wanted the merger,
according to Zekan, in order to provide greater educational opportunity
and increased access in a neglected area of the state.

The two
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institutions to be merged opposed the legislation, favoring instead
individual expansion.

Likewise in the Lowell merger, neither

institution vigorously supported the merger proposed by a local
legislator.

The goal, as stated in the merger bill introduced by the

legislator, was to expand educational opportunity.

In the Boston State

and UMass, Boston merger which was opposed by both institutions,
especially the former, the legislature and governor were the prime
movers.

The motivation for the merger on the part of these elected

officials was the diminished reputation of and declining enrollment at
Boston State, state revenue problems, a desire for greater efficiency,
and the elimination of program redundancy.

The impetus for the Blue

Hills/Massasoit merger came from the local communities which funded
Blue Hills.

Due to tax ceiling legislation, these communities could not

afford continued funding.
In analyzing these mergers, Zekan [1990] concluded that public
policy and not institutional primacy was the major impetus.

He points

out that the merger of public institutions creates a situation where
issues of institutional autonomy and public policy meet.

In the four

mergers he studied, the desire to advance the standing of public
higher education by providing greater educational opportunity as
defined by elected public officials prevailed over the accommodation
of individual concerns of the various institutions.

With the exception

of the Blue Hills situation, he further states that financial consideration
was not a direct cause but rather an opportunity to enact public policy.
This certainly is in sharp contrast to the role that financial exigency
plays in the merger of private institutions discussed in the beginning
of this chapter.

From Zekan's [1990] analysis, one could conclude that the public
officials possessed the high ground of espousing access and expanded
educational opportunity for the citizens of state in contrast to the
parochial and self-serving position of the institutions.

This certainly is

a role reversal of how many educational officials view their stance on
issues in general.

The motivations of public officials, however, need

additional examination.

Returning to the studies conducted on the

Wisconsin merger, evidence of possible other motivations on the part
of public officials may be found.

Some observers claimed that

Governor Lucey proposed the merger to divert attention from a
taxation issue, to help win re-election, or to gain immediate control
over the governing board by new appointments.

Legislators were

interested in the merger in order to increase legislative control and to
eliminate competing lobbying efforts [Heim, 1976].

For elected

officials, it is quite possible that increased educational opportunity and
efficiency sought through a merger are euphemisms for increased
control and the self-serving motive to remain in office.

It may very

well be a case of public policy tempered by power principles and pure
political pragmatism.
The theme of public policy considerations and impetus for a
merger from elected officials is also found in consolidation efforts in
Washington, D.C., Arkansas, and Oregon.^

The Congress of the United

States played a major role in merging three institutions in the nation's
capital [Dilworth, 1981].

Cited reasons for the merger included a low

level of cooperation, a need for coordination, elimination of program
duplication, anticipated financial stress and equal educational
opportunity.

In Arkansas, the legislature initiated and passed merger

legislation creating the University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff without
consulting the institution [Neal, 1978].

The stated reason was to

streamline budget procedures and restore the institution to financial
solvency.

The merger of schools of education in the Oregon system

was the direct result of political pressure from the state legislature
because of revenue reduction [McMahon, 1984].
Another example of public policy issues playing a significant
role was the proposed merger that did not take place between the
University of Maryland Eastern Shore and Salisbury State College.
Both institutions are publicly supported, located 12 miles apart and
offer basically the same programs.

Salisbury was much smaller and

had a predominately white student body.
predominately black institution.

Eastern Shore was a

Proponents for the merger held that

it would expand and diversify educational opportunity, be more
economically efficient and result in a biracially constituted institution.
In his study of the proposal, Richardson [1976] concluded that the
merger would not yield significant savings or a lower cost per student.
Economies of scale would not take place because both campuses would
still have to be operated resulting in few fixed cost items being
eliminated.

Richardson suggests that although the merger would

eliminate program duplication and provide greater breadth, depth and
diversity in the curriculum, cooperative arrangements could produce
the same results.

Using the merger to accomplish the public policy

objective of desegregation is also questioned by Richardson.

The

merger would mean the dissolution of Eastern Shore as a black
institution with the possible resulting loss of a supportive environment
for minorities in the state.
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Within the group of public mergers studied, there is an exception
to the pattern of external public policy impetus.

A study by Greider

[1988] of the merger of three municipal institutions with their
respective state systems reveals that financial stress was the impetus
for these institutions to seek a merger.^

In each case the local

municipality had too small a tax base to support the institution.
Although his case study dealt with only three of these mergers, he
reported that 14 out of a total of 15 municipal institutions became part
of state systems between 1962 and 1985.

In his case studies of the

three, the institutions viewed a merger as the only solution to funding
problems.

Even though the representatives of these institutions

were emotionally against a merger and realized the loss of autonomy
in administrative matters, • pragmatically they realized their survival
required it.

In this regard, these mergers are more similar to the

merger of the private institutions in this study than to those of the
public institutions.

It is also interesting to note that in all three

mergers, the local community was in favor of the merger because of
the prospect of tax relief.
Comparison with the Literature
A significant difference that emerges when the reasons for the
mergers in this study are compared with the literature is the sharp
distinction which exists between the motivation for the mergers of
public and private institutions.
always evident or addressed.

In the literature, this distinction is not
Although mergers in both spheres result

from severe pressure, this study indicates that the mergers of public
institutions resulted from external public policy decisions to expand
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opportunity and increase efficiency, whereas in the private sector, the
reason was financial exigency due to internal problems.
What little attention is given in the literature to the reasons for
the mergers of public institutions usually addresses financial issues
tied to the lack of coordination between institutions.

This study finds

that public policy initiatives are a cause of public mergers.

The failure

of coordinating boards and institutions to effectuate efficiency,
eliminate duplication and establish accountability has contributed to
the initiation of the mergers by public officials.

The desire of elected

officials to expand educational opportunity for their constituencies and
to gain more control over the educational enterprise has also played
a role.

Of course, the practical political consideration of staying in

office and power enhancement have also probably been present.
In the literature, the support of a merger by the governor of
the state has been identified as an important and pivotal factor in
effectuating merger.

This study not only substantiates that contention,

but indicates the significant role played by governors in initiating the
merger proposals.

This key role of the state's chief executive was

illustrated in the mergers that took place in Wisconsin and
Massachusetts.

The role of constituent groups in mergers has also

been identified in the literature.

One prediction concerning

constituents may have to be modified.

Some claim that the mergers of

public institutions may be rare because constituents will go to an
extreme to stop them, thus making the political cost too high.

In the

Wisconsin and Massachusetts mergers, several factors were present
that either overcame strong opposition or prevented it from forming.
These factors included public reaction to high taxes, economic
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downturn, disenchantment with actions of faculty and students, and
the desire to attain a greater common good.

It is also possible that the

reduction in state funding for public institutions, a public policy act,
could force institutions to initiate mergers on their own in order to
enhance their standing and funding.

This approach would definitely

diminish the possibility of constituent groups blocking the merger.

It

is possible that a merger could produce a larger and more powerful
lobbying group of citizens and politicians for the combined institution.
One area where constituent groups may in fact be very active in
blocking a merger is in those states where it may be used to integrate
campuses.

The literature indicates that courts have ruled that merger

is a viable strategy to accomplish desegregation.

In the case study of

the proposed Maryland merger, evidence is presented that blacks may
be opposed to losing their identity with an institution especially when
benefits can be obtained through other means, such as institutional
cooperation.
For private institutions, this study substantiates the contention in
the literature that financial exigency is the essential motivation for a
merger.

In each case study, the merger was consummated as the only

alternative to closure.

It allowed trustees to salvage their

responsibility to continue educational services and opportunities.

This

study also documents the literature's causative factors leading to a
financial difficulty.

They included small size, lack of economy of scale,

little or no endowment, enrollment decline and poor management.

The

study goes beyond these findings by identifying the characteristic of
steadfastness as apparently underlying the causative factors leading to
a merger and the choice of a merger over closure.

This inability to
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change and adapt takes the form of trying to preserve the heritage of
an institution and its specialized mission.
In the literature, geographical location, previous cooperation,
program changes and quality improvement were identified as
contributing factors to a merger.

The analysis of the case studies

indicates that these factors were secondary and played a limited role.
Most of the institutions sought a merger partner within close
proximity which would allow for the continuation of their programs
and/or special mission, with the latter consideration being more
important.

This was illustrated by Milwaukee-Downer choosing to

merge with another private institution rather than with the public one
that abutted its campus.

In some of the mergers, quality improvement

was mentioned, but usually in the context of making the merger more
palatable for faculty, students and other constituent groups.

In the

cases studied, previous cooperation was either non-existent or limited
and not a major factor.
There is little mention in the literature of the reasons why
an institution would merge with one that is experiencing financial
difficulty.

The general position put forth in the literature is that there

must be an enormous advantage for the stronger institution to accept a
troubled partner.

This study gives further insight to the reasons.

In

examining the cases, financial gain appears to be the significant
advantage for the stronger partner.

It takes many different forms.

For some, it involves the expansion of complementary programs for a
stronger market position.
facilities at bargain prices.

For others, it is an opportunity to expand
For still others, it is an opportunity to

lessen competition, eliminate duplication and increase revenue as a
result of a larger enrollment.
The conventional wisdom stated in the literature is that two
troubled institutions should not merge.

The reasoning is that this

would only compound the problems and lead to the failure of the
merged institution.

Two case studies present exceptions to this rule.

In the Barrington/Gordon merger, Barrington College was in a difficult
financial position.

Although Gordon was in a better position and

operating with small surpluses, it shared some of the same factors
contributing to Barrington's problems.
however, is a viable entity 6 years later.

The merged institution,
In a similar matchup, Owen

College and Lemoyne College both had financial difficulty.

Their

tenuous financial status, both present and future, was the critical force
behind the merger.

The combining of their assets has resulted in an

institution which is still in existence 23 years after the merger.
The literature also indicates that institutions with complementary
rather than duplicate programs are better suited to be merger
partners.

Two mergers in this study, however, illustrate the feasibility

and viability of merging similar institutions.

Both Barrington College

and Gordon College shared a common heritage and mission but with a
degree of program differentiation.

The program differentiation was

actually viewed as an impediment by Gordon, the stronger of the two
institutions.

The merger, however, provided an opportunity to attain

an economy of scale and establish a financially stable Christian college
in the face of financial realities and demographic forecasts [Winfrey,
1989].

For two very similar business colleges in Michigan, Detroit

College of Business and Davenport College, a merger provided an
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opportunity to eliminate competition for students, to consolidate
admissions and other services and to strengthen financial stability.
The merger also united under one administration, campuses located in
the eastern and western parts of the state.
Merger Motives

Interpreted

As described in this chapter, the decisions to enter the mergers
were made for pragmatic reasons by individuals and groups in
positions of authority.

For the private institutions, the main motive of

presidents and trustees was to alleviate financial exigency.

In the

public sector, the principal reasons were to increase educational
opportunity, accountability and efficiency as defined by various
government officials external to the institutions.
The merger decisions can also be viewed as being made by the
hierarchy of a bureaucratic organization.

The decisions were based on

facts and purely objective considerations as viewed by the hierarchy.
For the private institutions, the hierarchy determined that the
financial situation was such that the organization could not continue to
survive as presently constituted.

Based on financial reports supplied

by senior financial administrators or consultants, the rational solution
was to either close or try to continue some vestige of their tradition
through a merger with another institution.

In the cases involving

public institutions, the governmental hierarchy made judgments based
on reports/studies or personal conviction as to the need to expand
educational opportunity for social, political and economic reasons
and/or to increase efficiency in the face of declining state revenues.
The decision of the hierarchy to enter a merger committed the
institutions in this study to probably the most drastic change in their
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histories.

Their decision brought to the fore a fundamental tension

that exists in organizations.

According to Lewin [1952], there exists

forces for change and forces for stability and equilibrium within any
system.

In examining the motives for the mergers considered in this

study, this tension between change and stability manifested itself in
different ways.
For the private institutions, there existed the tension between the
administration’s steadfastness in maintaining a tradition on the one
hand and the rapidly shrinking financial resources resulting from
enrollment decline and other environmental factors that warranted
fundamental change on the other.

For the public institutions, the

tension was between external public policy initiatives to increase
opportunity and efficiency as opposed to the internal community's
desire to maintain traditional academic pursuits.

This is a classic

example of the public's desire for change conflicting with traditional
academic interests.

Within this context, both the public and private

institutions involved in the mergers found themselves reacting to
change rather than actively managing or directing the tension between
the two fundamental forces.

This will be addressed in more detail in

the final chapter.
Although the findings in this chapter present different reasons
why public and private institutions merged, they do share some
commonality.

Bolman and Deal [1984] state that in the political

perspective, organizations are viewed as "arenas of scarce resources
where power and influence are constantly affecting the allocation of
resources among individuals or groups" [p. 5],

This approach holds

that organizational change is always political in that it involves the
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pursuit of self-interest and power.

The political elements of power,

self-interest and scarce resources were all present as motives in the
mergers

studied.

In the mergers involving both public and private institutions, the
use of power was evident.

The dominant group in the mergers

involving private institutions, trustees and presidents, used their
positions and fiduciary responsibility in reaching the decision to
merge.

In the public sector, government officials exercised their

power of control over the educational enterprise.

In both

instances, the authorities had access to the power of position in
reaching the decision to merge.

From a political perspective, these

groups are only one of many contenders for power.

As the process of

merger unfolds, other constituent groups seeking power will emerge.
This will be discussed in the next chapter.
In examining the motivations for the mergers in this study, a
second element of the political perspective, the pursuit of institutional
self-interest, is clearly present for both private and public institutions.
For the private institutions experiencing financial difficulty, a merger
was viewed as a way of perpetuating their heritage and specialized
purpose.

Self-preservation, albeit through a merger, is a fundamental

manifestation of institutional self-interest.

The dominant role of self-

interest is also clearly evident in the motivation of the stronger
partner in agreeing to enter a merger with a financially troubled
institution.

Financial gain resulting from acquiring students, programs

or property at bargain prices is a strong motivational factor to promote
an institution's self-interest.

People who run institutions often find it

difficult to pass up an opportunity to improve the institution's
financial position with a minimum investment.
In the mergers involving public institutions, self-interest
manifests itself in a different way.

In these mergers, the public policy

initiative to increase educational opportunity and efficiency is
contrasted with the individual institution's interest in preserving
traditional academic values.

The former group is motivated by

pragmatic social, economic and political considerations.

The latter

group owes a particular loyalty to autonomy and academic disciplines
and is motivated by the professional goal of the advancement of
knowledge.

In both instances, self-preservation plays a central role.

For the politician, the fundamental truism is that to exercise power,
one must continue to be elected. For the faculty member, one must
publish for professional recognition and advancement.
A third major characteristic of the political view of organizations
is the existence of scarce resources.

The seven private institutions in

this study were certainly motivated to consider merger because of
financial exigency brought on by declining enrollments and other
factors.

The use of the merger alternative by government officials in

the public sector to increase efficiency was certainly motivated in part
by concern over the allocation of limited or declining state revenues.
From the political perspective then, the motivation for these
mergers was to promote or protect institutional self-interest.

Within

this interpretation, the existence of scarce financial resources created
the crisis that was the catalyst for the hierarchy to exercise its power
to move the organization toward a merger.

Some organizational

theorists hold that crisis unfreezes an organization so that change can
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take place.

The degree to which these organizations were unfrozen

and the congruency between the merger process and the political
perspective will be examined in the next chapter.
Summary
The private and public institutions involved in this study entered
their mergers for different reasons.

For the private institutions, financial

exigency exacerbated by management problems was the reason.

For the

public institutions, public policy concerns of expanded opportunity and
accountability, as viewed by governmental entities external to the
institutions, were the primary reasons.
apparent in the literature.

This distinction is not readily

Also, exceptions to the conventional wisdom

that two financially troubled institutions or those with similar programs
should not merge have been presented.
The motivation of decision makers in both public and private sectors,
however, share some common characteristics.

In both categories, the

decision makers, individuals and groups at the upper level of the
organizational hierarchy, were confronted with the classic tension
between forces for change and the forces to maintain the status quo
within the organization.

For the private institutions, this manifested itself

in the desire to maintain traditional mission and programs in the face of
shrinking resources.

For the public institutions, the tension took the form

of meeting external policy needs versus maintaining traditional academic
interest.
From a political perspective, other common characteristics in decision
making were identified.

In both categories, the decision makers made

use of the power of their positions in reaching the merger decision.
pursuit of self-interest was also present in both categories.

The

In the private
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sector, it took the form of the weaker partner seeking to perpetuate its
tradition and the stronger partner seeking financial gain.

In the public

sector, the external entities were motivated by pragmatic social, economic
and political considerations and the internal constituencies were
motivated by professional academic concerns.

Finally, scarce resources

played a role in the decision making in both categories.
In the next chapter, the process that was utilized to consummate
these mergers will be analyzed.

The impact on the process of the

forces and factors identified in this chapter will also be examined.

Notes
The mergers involving private institutions included in this study
are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Barrington College and Gordon College (1985).
Milwaukee-Downer College and Lawrence College
(1964).
Detroit College of Business and Davenport College (1985).
Owen College and Lemoyne College (1981).
Parsons School of Design and New School of Social
Research (1970).
Western College and Miami (Ohio) University (1974).
New College and University of South Florida (1975).

The major impediments to merger identified by Deubell [1984,
pp. 95-6] are in order of importance:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Declining enrollment and a high-tenured, middle-aged
faculty.
Loss of accreditation.
Too many fixed-cost obligations, or adding new ones in
the face of declining enrollments.
Deterioration of surrounding urban areas making campus
less desirable.
Resident college in an isolated rural location without a
strong image.
Antiquated and expensive physical plant, making it
difficult to move good programs.
Non-existent or low level of reserves and endowment.
Repeated use of reserves for operating expenses.
Except for "elite" institutions, private tuition that exceeds
nearby public college by more than $3,000 annually.
Inability to strengthen institutional image or carve out a
new one.
Inability to raise tuition comparable to the cost of living
for three conservative years.
Inability to make any principal payments on federallyfinanced buildings.
Retrenchment with quality deterioration.
Inability to reduce employment coincident with
enrollment decline.
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3

The mergers of public institutions included in this study are:
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

10.
11.
12.
13.

The University of Wisconsin System (1971).
Bradford Durfee College of Technology and New Bedford
Institute of Technology into Southeastern Massachusetts
University (1964).
Lowell State College and Lowell Technological Institute
into University of Lowell (1975).
Boston State College into the University of Massachusetts
at Boston (1982).
Blue Hills Technical Institute into Massasoit Community
College (1985).
District of Columbia Teachers College, Federal City
College and Washington Technical Institute into the
University of the District of Columbia (1974).
Arkansas Agricultural, Mechanical and Normal College
into the University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff (1972).
Proposed merger of Salisbury State with University of
Maryland Eastern Shore (1976).
School of Education Oregon State University with the
Division of Education Western Oregon State College
(1982).
University of Louisville into state system (1970).
University of Omaha into University of Nebraska at
Omaha (1968).
Wichita University into Wichita State University (1964).
Two unnamed public institutions (1975).

4

The four Massachusetts mergers are listed in Note 3, numbers
2, 3, 4 and 5.

5

The institutions involved in merger from these areas are listed
in Note 3, numbers 6, 7 and 9.

6

The three municipal institutions are listed in Note 3, numbers
10, 11 and 12.

CHAPTER 3
THE MERGER PROCESS
Based on the analysis of the case studies, the merger process
moves along a continuum from the decision to seek a merger to the
negotiation of specific issues leading up to the actual merger
agreement.

Typically these issues include the transferring of

programs, employees, students and assets as well as preserving in
some form the identity and heritage of the partners.
This chapter will focus on the various tensions that affect the
process as institutions move from initiation to the final merger agree¬
ment.

During this process, the dominance of one partner over the

other will be presented as a significant factor affecting the merger.
How the dominate-subordinate roles during the process are related to
the reasons for the merger of institutions will also be examined.
Findings concerning how consultation, conflict resolution, organi¬
zational structure, planning, leadership and legal considerations affect
the process will also be presented.
the chapter with the literature.

They will be compared throughout

The chapter concludes with

interpretations of the process from a political perspective that
provides an explanation of the documented conflict.
The Dominance Factor
In the previous chapter, the clear distinction that exists between
the reasons for merging public and private institutions was identified
as a major finding.

In examining the process utilized to effectuate

these mergers, a common characteristic emerges that has no
relationship to the private/public status of the institutions involved.
The pattern of one partner playing a dominant role in the process was
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present in mergers between private institutions, public institutions
and the combination of the two.

This dominance by the stronger

partner played an important role in the negotiation between
institutions leading up to the consummation of the merger agreement.
One case will be described to illustrate the various ways that this
phenomenon affects the process.
Western College sought a merger with Miami University to solve
financial problems and to continue its identity as a residential college
of Miami.

At the outset of negotiations, the faculty of Western was

euphoric with the prospect of continuing the college identity and their
own employment through a merger [Kennedy, 1975].
was short-lived.

Their euphoria

From the outset, Miami resisted the incorporation of

Western faculty and questioned the viability of its program.

In a

memorandum of understanding outlining general points approved by
both governing boards, Miami made no commitment to continue
faculty, staff or programs of Western after a transitional year.
Although the terms of this memorandum clearly favored Miami,
Kennedy reported that the president of Western had faith in the
president of Miami that future negotiations would be favorable to
Western.

The fact that Western was in a deep financial crisis most

likely played a principal role in its board accepting the initial terms
favorable to Miami.
Following the memorandum of understanding, Miami's dominance
continued when it unilaterally requested input from its community
on how best to utilize Western and appointed a planning committee
which did not include any representatives from Western.

This

created tension between the two institutions, aroused antagonism
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among Western faculty and all but ended the spirit of cooperation
[Kennedy, 1975].
its chancellor:
Miami" [p. 91].

The mind-set of Miami is illustrated by comments of

’’Western is going out of business; how we use it is up to
Faculty members of Western were not included on the

committee because of Miami's position that it would be funding the
program and therefore Western should have no say in the matter. In
addition, it was held that Western faculty would push for academic
programs that Miami believed would be weak educationally and
unsound financially.

By the time the committee began to develop

recommendations, Kennedy found that "frustration, disappointment,
anger and animosity against Miami were prevalent attitudes among
members of the Western community" [p. 106].
The planning committee's recommendation to make Western a
liberal arts/interdisciplinary college was approved by Miami's
senate and board of trustees.

The faculty of Western was against

the liberal arts proposal but for the interdisciplinary college
proposal.

Western trustees objected to the type of degree to be

awarded to students in the new college and to the lack of a tenure
provision for faculty.

While Miami was debating what to do with

Western from a program standpoint, negotiations on legal and financial
issues were going smoothly and culminated with the selling of
property, buildings and equipment.

The transfer of programs,

personnel and students continued to be controversial and to be
dictated by Miami.

At the conclusion of the transitional year, Miami

decided to offer a freshman program that would bear the name
Western.

It would only give first consideration to Western faculty

who applied for any Miami vacancies.

Only a small number of faculty
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members were hired.
transfers.

Miami would also accept Western students as

Only 50 students were interested.

What started out as a desire of Western to provide for the
continuance of an innovative undergraduate liberal arts experience,
ended with virtually no continuity.
of the process by Miami.
president by Western:

This resulted from the dominance

This process is accurately described by the

"the whole negotiated process...as far as

Western was concerned, moved from affiliation to acquisition"
[Kennedy, 1975, p. 156].
process?

How did Miami come to dominate the

Certainly the fundamental factor that facilitated Miami's

dominance was the financial condition of Western.

The financial

exigency, which drove Western to seek a merger in the first place, also
placed it in a weak negotiating position.

If any vestiges of the

institutions were to continue, Western needed Miami more than Miami
needed Western.

Because of its weak negotiating position, Kennedy

concluded that Western could not control merger issues, but only react
to Miami's initiatives.
In analyzing Western's approach to the process, additional
factors that contributed to exacerbating its weak bargaining position
can be identified.

The strategy of dividing negotiations into two

separate stages, legal/financial aspects first followed by program/staff
continuation issues, seriously weaken any bargaining position it had.
This conclusion can be supported by Kennedy's [1975] assertion that
for Miami, Western's program and faculty were not attractive.
Perhaps Western's leadership was lulled into the two stage approach
by public statements from Miami's leadership.

Kennedy observed that

"the sensitivity of the negotiations process and the political
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maneuvering necessary to achieve merger within the public sphere
seem to create a negotiations climate where public statements can
not be equated with true motivations" [p. 188].
In addition to Western's naivete as to Miami motives, the
negotiators for Western did not employ any specialist in legal or
merger matters in the early stages of negotiations.

This was in

contrast to Miami which had an array of specialists who
orchestrated the process.

The lack of professional help, naivete

as to Miami's motives and, most of all, financial crisis all combined to
place Western in a position to be dominated by Miami.

The end result

was that Western bargained away any chance of preserving some or
all of its program and staff in exchange for one year of financial
solvency.

Based on his analysis of the merger, Kennedy [1975] draws

two major conclusions regarding the process:

leaders should recognize

the natural adversarial position that develops during negotiations
regardless of trust and they should assess strengths and weaknesses,
motivations and perspectives of both parties.
Although the other cases involving private institutions examined
in this study do not address the merger process as extensively as the
Miami/Western case, evidence of the financially stronger partner
dominating the other is present in many of them.

In the Parsons/New

School merger, the board of trustees of New School, the financially
stable partner, voted the merger with Parsons only on the condition
that Parsons would cover its own operating deficit through fund¬
raising.

In the Milwaukee-Downer/Lawrence College merger, the

stronger position of Lawrence College forced Downer to accept the
naming of a paper college for Downer rather than changing the name

to Lawrence-Downer College.

Although financially troubled, Owen

College was able to gain a hyphenated position in the new name of
the merged institution, LeMoyne-Owen College, due to the transferring
of its endowment. It was not able, however, to negotiate successfully
the transfer of its main program, business and secretarial science.

All

these examples support the contention that the buyers of financially
distressed institutions were in a position to dominate negotiations.
Even when negotiations took place with a spirit of mutual
trust, the dominance by one partner was still evident.

In the

Barrington/Gordon merger, the institution in the stronger financial
position, Gordon had the final say in determining program and faculty
transfer.

Several Barrington programs were not continued by the new

institution and only four faculty members actually transferred to the
new institution, located on the Gordon campus [Winfrey, 1989].

In

addition, during the negotiations on the name of the merged
institution, Gordon's dominant role is evident.

Barrington College

wanted a hyphenated name, Gordon-Barrington College.
College did not.

Gordon

The final compromise favored Gordon and resulted in

a cumbersome name-Gordon College:

The United College of Gordon

and Barrington.
There is one outstanding exception to the pattern of financial
exigency creating a weak negotiating position that results in a
substantial loss of identity or continuity for the private institution.
In the merger of New College with the University of South Florida, New
College was able to continue its unique curriculum and identity by
becoming an honors college within the University's structure.
result, most faculty and students were retained [Reed, 1978].

As a
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Although it was facing a financial crisis as severe as the one
confronting Western College, New College was able to negotiate a
unique arrangement regarding the funding of the honors college.

The

merger agreement provided for the creation of a foundation, made up
of former New College trustees, that would raise money for the college
over and above state appropriations.

If the foundation were

unsuccessful in raising its share of the budget, the provision of the
merger agreement to continue the college's academic program would
be nullified.

The agreement also provided that New College faculty

would keep their tenure only within the honors college.

Although New

College shared the same financial difficulty as other private
institutions in this study, it avoided dominance by the stronger
partner and was able to retain its identity and ensure its continuity
through an innovative financial arrangement.
In analyzing the mergers between public institutions, the
dominance factor was also present.

In contrast to financial exigency

determining the subordinate partner in the private sector, reputation
and power determined the dominant partner in the merger of public
institutions.

The merger of Boston State College and the University of

Massachusetts, Boston in 1982 is a prime example.
With the Commonwealth of Massachusetts facing financial
difficulties, the funding of two public institutions of higher education
within the City of Boston became a concern for legislators and the state
board of regents.

After a series of political moves, funding for public

colleges in the Boston area was substantially reduced in the state
budget. Prior to this funding crisis, Boston State "suffered from a
diminished reputation and it compared poorly to the new and
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growing" UMass, Boston [Zekan, 1990, p. 53].

When the decision was

made by the political and educational leaders to consolidate
institutions, the size and prestige of UMass, Boston placed it in a
dominant position over Boston State.

According to one Boston State

leader, UMass, Boston took the position that the merger should be
"dictated and governed by the University.

UMass Boston would

take whatever programs and personnel it wanted and needed"
[Zekan, 1990, p. 77].

This is consistent with the remarks of a former

president of UMass who stated that once merger became inevitable,
"the strategy then became how to help UMass Boston come out of the
situation stronger and to avoid those compromises that would diminish
its stature" [Zekan, 1990, p. 73].
A second example of one partner dominating the other in the
merger of public institutions is documented in Cannon's study [1977]
of two unnamed institutions, Eastern State College and Eastern
Technological.

In this particular merger, what started out to be a

marriage of equals, ended up with State Technological dominating the
process.

Based on a consultant's recommendation, legislation was

passed in 1973 that mandated the merger and established a planning
board to coordinate and implement it by 1975.

Initial deliberations

addressed issues of equality, continuity and fair representation.
According to Cannon, Technological appeared to want a dominant role
and State College wanted equal an role.

Several actions indicate

Technological's dominance. The newly created board for the merged
institution appointed Technological's president as its interim president.
Eventually, most top administrators were also from Technological.
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Due to funding difficulties, the lower pay scale for State College faculty
continued after the merger.

The dominant role played by

Technological can be traced to the fact that prior to the merger, it was
larger in size and staff and had a better budget, working conditions
and organizational structure.

In the perception of the former State

College employees, what started out as a consolidation merger actually
ended as an acquisition by Technological.
Another example of dominance is presented in the Wisconsin
merger.

The size and reputation of the University of Wisconsin-

Madison enabled it to play a dominant role in the merger of the
two university systems.

During deliberations on the merger

implementation bill, the central administration of the new system,
composed mostly of Madison administrators, successfully lobbied for
provisions that would not significantly alter their status or power as
the University's primary administrative unit.

According to Heim

[1976], some of those involved thought that to tamper with the
governing structure of the prestigious University of WisconsinMadison would ultimately lead to a decline in quality.

On tenure and

faculty status policies, the less prestigious Wisconsin State University
lost out as the implementation bill adopted basically the University of
Wisconsin-Madison policies.

This turned the State University Faculty

Association against the implementation bill [Buchanan, 1977].

Some

even feared that Madison would so dominate the new system that
campuses would be closed to support the flagship campus
[Carothers, 1974].

Because of this fear, local autonomy and campus

mission became main issues in the debate over the bill to implement
this merger.

These were the last strongholds for the State University

campuses against the dominance of the more prestigious flagship
university.
A final example of dominance in the public sector involves
the mergers of municipal universities with their state systems.
When Omaha became part of the University of Nebraska system, its
engineering department was centralized at the University of
Nebraska-Lincoln.

In addition, all administrative/budgetary

matters had to go through Lincoln creating arguments over turf,
funding and identity.

In analyzing this merger and two other

municipal mergers with state systems, Greider [1988] concludes
that the urban institutions definitely developed a feeling of
subordination to their flagship partners, producing a "stepchild"
relationship. Prestige and power were obviously at work in these
mergers.
As was identified in the previous chapter, the moving forces
for the merger of public institutions were external to the
institutions themselves.

It is interesting to note that once some

institutions realized that their merger was a fait accompli, they
immediately took pragmatic steps to ensure that they would
influence or dominate the negotiations regarding implementation.
In the Wisconsin merger, the new board of trustees worked for
successful implementation of the merger because of a very
pragmatic reason—the merger was going to happen [Buchanan,
1977].

The faculty association of Wisconsin State University,

which was originally for merger but initially against the tenure
and status proposed in the implementation process, actively tried
to amend provisions in its favor as the process unfolded [Heim,
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1976].

It is also evident in the Boston State/UMass, Boston

merger that when UMass, Boston realized that the merger was
inevitable, it worked to gain the most advantageous position
[Zekan, 1990].

In sharp contrast to this, however, is the position taken

by the faculty at Boston State College.

Evidently believing that the

institution could not be closed, the faculty association opted to fight
the merger rather than to gain some degree of control over the
implementation of the merger with the University.

By so doing, Zekan

concludes that Boston State faculty lost an opportunity of negotiating a
favorable

settlement.

In the literature, the dominance factor receives scant attention
except from Chambers [1981b, 1983].

The analysis of the case studies

certainly supports her contention that what starts out as a
consolidation of equals usually ends as an acquisition with one
institution dominating.

This dominance translates into radical change

for the acquired institution.

It also increases the degree of conflict

between the merging institutions.
Conflict and Consultation
A second significant characteristic of the merger process
that emerged from the analysis of the case studies is the degree
of consultation with constituent groups employed by the decision¬
makers at the involved institutions.

It ranges from virtual secrecy

from the faculty, students and public to extensive involvement of
representatives of the academic community in the process.

In the

mergers involving private institutions, secrecy was employed in both
the initiation and implementation stages.

In almost all cases involving

public institutions, varying degrees of involvement of constituent
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groups were present in the negotiation stages leading to the
implementation of the mergers.
In the mergers involving private institutions, virtually all
of them kept deliberations secretive during the initial stage of the
process.

The financial exigency facing these institutions played a role

in their decision not to involve faculty or students in the deliberations.
At Milwaukee-Downer College, for example, the chairperson of the
board of trustees remarked that if faculty and students were involved,
decisions would be "inhibited by more varied opinions...they would
have prevented a quick decision.

A matter of this sensitivity could not

be handled by referendum" [Howard, 1980, p. 159].

All details of

the merger in this case were agreed to by the two institutions with
such a high degree of secrecy that when the announcement of the
merger and its details was made to staff and students of MilwaukeeDowner, absolute surprise and shocked disbelief were expressed.
Howard concluded in his study that secrecy enabled the institution to
act expeditiously but at a price—it limited the information available to
trustees and produced a negative effect on the college community.

In

the Parsons/New School merger, the faculty of both institutions were
unaware of the financial crisis and uniformed concerning the merger
negotiations.

The administration of New School defended the lack of

consultation on the grounds of time constraints and the desire to
prevent lengthy and involved debate [Levy, 1979].

The same

approach existed at Western and Miami during the initial negotiations
concerning their merger.
The fears expressed by decision-makers in the above cases are
validated to an extent by what happened in the Barrington/Gordon
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and LeMoyne/Owens mergers.

In both of these mergers, the

institutions involved their constituencies very early in the process.
This did result in opposition groups forming to block the merger.

At

Barrington College, a group of alumni formed in an attempt to buy the
campus.

This led to an acrimonious debate within the Barrington

community [Winfrey, 1989].

In the LeMoyne/Owen merger, LeMoyne

alumni resisted the merger on the grounds that the institutions were
not equal and would result in a loss of prestige for LeMoyne.

Owen

students demonstrated against the merger and the faculty asked that
it be postponed [Searcy, 1981].

Despite opposition, however, both of

these mergers were consummated.
In contrast to the secrecy and lack of consultation that marked
the merger of private institutions, the mergers of public institutions
were characterized by openness and involvement of constituent
groups during the implementation stage.

Commissions, task forces and

committees were widely utilized to negotiate issues involving the
status of programs, staff and students.

As was shown in the previous

chapter, the impetus for merging public institutions in this study came
from sources external to the institutions.

This most likely led to the

involvement of constituent groups in order to resolve the inevitable
resistance and conflict that would result from an external initiative.
The Wisconsin merger is a case in point.
In the Wisconsin system merger, the bill that authorized the
merger did not address any of the issues that would have to be
resolved in order to implement the consolidation.

The bill created an

implementation committee and charged it with producing a bill that
would effectuate a compromise among the competing demands of the
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institution, legislators and individual interest groups.

Membership

consisted of representatives of governing boards, faculty, students,
citizens and the legislature.

Issues that generated the most

controversy included faculty status for various professional groups,
the type of tenure system, the body that would determine the mission
of each institution, institutional status for the extension system, role of
students in governance and relationships among institutions
[Buchanan, 1977].

Coalitions formed around each issue.

Heim [1976]

reported that the committee structured the implementation bill that
succeeded "through a long process of compromises and
accommodation" [p. 47].

He concluded that the committee performed a

difficult task in a professional non-partisan manner, which lessened
the likelihood of any concerted opposition.
Several other public institutions also utilized committees to
involve constituents and to manage conflict.

In the merger studied by

Cannon [1977], a study commission, external consultants and a
planning board to coordinate and implement the merger over a two
year period were utilized.

She posits that the planning board had no

real authority but was established to manage conflict.

The most

extensive use of committees during the implementation stage took
place in the University of the District of Columbia merger.

A legion of

task forces, committees and councils charged with specific
responsibilities conducted a long series of open hearings that involved
faculty and students.

A transition committee, steering committee and

administrative center were also established to facilitate the merger.
Three-fourths of the respondents to a survey agreed that faculty.
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students and administrators were involved to a great extent in
planning and recommended the consultation procedures as being
very useful to other institutions [Taylor, 1978].

The value of

consultation is also illustrated in the University of Arkansas at Pine
Bluff merger.

Initially the legislature merged Arkansas A. M. & N.

College into the university system without consultation with the
institution.

This triggered negative reactions from faculty, students,

alumni and the black community.

As a result, a new bill was passed

which was more considerate of the institution's concerns [Neal, 1978].
Exactly how consultation helps to manage conflict is examined
in depth by McMahon [1984] in his study of the merger of
educational divisions of Oregon State University and Western
Oregon State College.

In this merger, transition teams were utilized to

accomplish consolidation.

He examined the hypothesis based on the

organizational change theory of Zaltman and Duncan that the ability to
resolve conflict will facilitate the transition from the initiation stage to
the implementation stage of the merger.

He found that conflict did

exist at every level and within each group.

The dominant strategy for

resolving conflict was to bring "the issues out in the open and working
them out among the parties involved" [pp. 122-3].

McMahon

concluded that this strategy was a positive contribution to the
performance of the involved departments and facilitated the
transition from initiation to implementation of the merger.

The

use of teams also facilitated the transition by producing
interpersonal relationships of a positive, supportive and cooperative
nature which were perceived as helping both task completion and

conflict resolution.

This also contributed to wide-spread support on

the part of participants for the merged structure.
The extensive use of committees to ensure consultation does
not automatically mean that participants will be satisfied.

In

the University of the District of Columbia merger, where participation
in the process was high, nearly three quarters of the survey
respondents agreed that faculty, students and administrators should
have been involved to a greater extent in planning [Taylor, 1978].
Perhaps this position is linked to their perception that the trustees
were the only decision-makers in the process and that power was not
widely dispersed.

Further support for this supposition is that although

the majority agreed that much consultation took place with concerned
persons, a majority also held that they had no or very little input in
drafting consolidation and administrative procedures.

When asked

if they exerted strong influence on the decision-making process,
a majority disagreed or were undecided.
The Oregon merger is an excellent example of the importance
of involvement of participants in the actual decision-making process.
McMahon [1984] reported that groups perceived increased influence in
decision-making due to the participation in information sharing.

This

led to increased ownership in, and commitment to, decisions which
contributed to successful implementation.

He found that the transition

teams consisting of representatives from both institutions facilitated
an increase in knowledge and contributed to positive attitudes. The
teams also participated in decisions concerning the new structure.
Participants formed the following attitudes which facilitated change:
recognition of the need for change, openness for change, capacity to
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accept and implement change, perceived control of decisions and
commitment to successful change.

The initiatiQn-impiementatiQn Continuum
Based on the analysis of the mergers in this study, the process of
merger moves along a continuum from initiation stages to
implementation stages.

Although the literature review indicates that

the merger of institutions is a process, it does not identify the stages
nor address the implications of the moving from one stage to the next.
In the first two sections of this chapter, it has been shown that as the
process moves along the continuum, one partner tends to dominate the
process and conflict arises from the confrontation of competing
demands.

It has also been stated that the involvement of participants

in the process can resolve the conflict and facilitate change.
Are there any other factors that affect the movement from
initiation to implementation?

Based on the examination of the case

studies, three additional factors emerge—organizational structure,
planning and leadership.

This section will discuss each of these

factors.
As the merger process moves from the initiation stages of
deciding on the viability of entering into a merger to the
implementation stages of negotiating the hard decisions, tasks of
the participants change.

McMahon [1984], in his study of the

Oregon merger, found that certain organizational characteristics
which facilitated the initiation of change could impede the
implementation process.

In other words, the organizational

structure should be different for each stage.

Of particular note

was his finding that the use of transition teams working outside
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the normal rules and procedures of the institutions provided the
flexibility to facilitate the gathering and processing of information
during the initiation stage.

As the teams moved toward the

implementation stage, however, formalization increased in order to
accomplish the task and respond to demands to document change.

In

addition, the involving of faculty members in the process represented
a decentralization during the initiation stages which facilitated
increased communication during a period of high uncertainty and
increased the amount of information available about the task.

As the

participants moved toward implementation, however, centralization
increased with a more specific line of authority (administrative) in
order to reduce role conflict or ambiguity.

McMahon concluded that

these strategies facilitated movement from initiation to
implementation in the Oregon merger.
In the mergers studied, the lack of planning to cope with the
transition from initiation to implementation was evident in many
of them.

The mergers of private institutions involved a degree of

haste that prevented careful and detailed planning. Facing financial
exigency, there apparently was not time for deliberate planning on the
part of these troubled institutions.

In the Western/Miami merger,

Kennedy [1975] concluded that the major financial crisis facing
Western created intense pressure, placed them in a reactionary mode
and precluded any pre-planning.

Winfrey [1989] reported that

complications involving the selling of a building on the Barrington
campus and the filing of a lawsuit by students "occurred because of
the rapid pace of events attendant with effecting a merger in such a
short period of time"

[p. 246].
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Evidently institutions that did not plan properly to avoid financial
problems, were also plagued by the lack of planning during the merger
process.
In the mergers of public institutions, where financial exigency
was not a factor, there are several examples of the lack of planning
due to time constraints.

Taylor [1978] in her survey of participants in

the University of the District of Columbia merger found that one of the
two most frequent answers to the question on how the merger process
should have been changed was to provide adequate planning time.
She concluded that the rapidity of the consolidation process hindered
the merger.

A possible explanation of why time is not available for

planning can be drawn from McMahon's [1984] finding that in the
Oregon merger, the process placed a high demand on administrative
time to solve pragmatic problems relating to daily operations.

This

did not allow time for careful planning or evaluation.
The Boston State/UMass, Boston merger illustrates how an
external body, the legislature, compressed the planning time for
the implementation of the merger.
process and personnel problems.

This resulted in an acrimonious
While the board of regents and the

two institutions were considering a consolidation plan based on the
University of Lowell model, which would be implemented over a three
year period, the legislature acted.

In its appropriation for higher

education, the legislative appropriation underfunded the cluster of
colleges located in the Boston area by six million dollars [Zekan, 1990].
In order to cope with the underfunding, the regents accelerated the
merger process from three years to less than one month!

Subsequent

maneuvering extended the period by several months with the final
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date of the closing of Boston State set by the legislature.

Zekan

reported that the impact of this process was felt for years and the
resulting legal problems involving the placement of personnel
continued for seven years.

He concluded that the manner of the

merger’s implementation was its major failure.
In contrast to the planning problems cited above, the
Massasoit/Blue Hills and the Davenport/Detroit mergers present
examples of the value of careful planning.

In the Massasoit merger,

the plan was initiated at the local level and provided for internal
agreements on inter-institutional issues before moving to external
agencies.

This facilitated the discussion and negotiation of sensitive

issues in an open manner.

Zekan [1990] identifies the fact that the

president of Massasoit, having been a faculty member at Boston State
at the time of its merger with UMass, Boston, played a crucial role in
developing an effective plan in dealing with personnel issues.

The

mistakes of that merger would be avoided in the Massasoit merger.
The smooth initiation and implementation of this merger, however,
may not have resulted entirely from good planning.

Zekan pointed out

the fact that the providing of state funding for all negotiated
commitments may have contributed to the successful process.
A more formalized planning approach to the merger of
institutions is presented by Brown [1987].

Based on his study of

the merger of Detroit College of Business and Davenport College,
he concluded that a single integrated planning structure and
formalized approach will enhance the process of merging two
institutions by providing a disciplined approach that will force
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them to create relationships.

He also concluded that good planning

can not occur in an environment of fear, anxiety and insecurity.
Although formalized planning techniques, such as strategic
planning, may be helpful, there may be resistance to them from
within institutions. McMahon [1984] points out in his study that
several writers claim that faculty and administrators often know
little about planning and other management theories and techniques.
He concluded that in higher education management and leadership,
there is little use of laws, models and scientific values.

This appears to

be the case in many of the mergers analyzed in this study.

Perhaps in

an attempt to overcome this, some institutions turn to consultants to
deal with the complex nature of moving from initiation to
implementation.

Aside from the use of lawyers to deal with legal

technicalities, the use of consultants by the institutions in this study
ranged from planning specialists in the Detroit/Davenport merger to
financial accountants in the Parsons/New School merger.

In Deubell's

survey [1984], leading educators recommended that experts should be
used in the merger process because the basic adversarial relationship
between faculty and administration makes it difficult to facilitate a
merger without assistance.

Kennedy [1975] cautions, however, that

leaders should use consultants as advisors and not as policy makers.
The final factor which affected the process of merger is that of
leadership.

The conclusion in the literature that a strong leader

usually controls the direction of a merger and is an important factor in
bringing it to conclusion is upheld in many of the cases in this study.
These leaders, however, held a variety of positions—presidents,
governors and board chairpersons.*
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Legal

Considerations

By its very definition, the merger of institutions has major legal
implications.

Dissolution of a corporate body, corporate structure and

powers, fiduciary responsibilities, transfer of assets, state laws,
contracts and restricted gifts are just some of the legal issues
identified in the literature that must be addressed during the merger
process.

The mergers in this study presented for the most part the

usual legal considerations identified in the literature.

This section will

present several of the unusual legal issues which arose in some of the
mergers.
The Barrington/Gordon merger presented several unusual legal
situations.

In the early stages of negotiation, lawyers for both

institutions developed a proposed merger agreement.

After

representatives of both colleges reviewed the document, it was
rejected because it contained provisions that the institution had
not requested [Winfrey, 1989].

The representatives then got together

and drew up a less complicated letter of intent that stressed mutual
trust and guided all future deliberations.

Later in the process, an

oversight by attorneys for Barrington College was to blame for an
unforeseen complication involving the sale of a gymnasium.

Because

the building was constructed with a grant from the U.S. Department of
Education, principal and appreciation pay back was required since the
sale took place before a stipulated time period had expired.
an unexpected loss of revenue for the merged institution.

This was

A final legal

hurdle to the merger was presented when nursing students at
Barrington College filed a lawsuit against the college charging that they
were denied the right to finish their education in Rhode Island.
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The merged institution would not offer a nursing program.

This

lawsuit delayed the signing of the merger agreement until the merged
institution could receive assurances that the insurance carrier for
Barrington College would assume any financial obligation resulting
from the suit.
Unusual legal issues can also arise from how assets are sold
and the use of the proceeds.

In the Westem/Miami merger,

attorneys for each institution clashed over the procedure to be
used to sell Western's property.

The Western attorney maintained

that a court opinion was necessary before the property could be
sold.

Both institutions eventually worked out an agreement that

did not require court action.

The courts, however, were used to

rule on the legality of Western to use residual assets for faculty
severance pay and to release its trustees from their obligation to
replace endowment funds used for operating expenses.

A final

entanglement involved a charter stipulation that if the college were to
close, assets would belong to the founding missionary sect.

The court

had to be satisfied that the sect no longer existed and had no heirs
before it could authorize Miami as the successor institution [Kennedy,
1975].
Unusual legal issues were not restricted to the mergers of private
institutions.

In the University of Wisconsin system merger, the

constitutionality of the consolidation was questioned.

The central

constitutional question centered on whether a single board for all the
universities would be considered part of the University or a separate
state agency.

Interpretations by attorneys general on previous merger

attempts seriously questioned the constitutionality on the grounds that
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merger would create a separate agency.

As a result, the merger bill

contained a provision which directed the attorney general to seek a
declaratory judgment on the issue [Carothers, 1974].
In order to minimize the complex and time-consuming legal
procedure inherent in a merger, two separate mergers in this study
utilized a technique used in the corporate world. Basically, the charters
of both participating institutions were retained and the members of
one board of trustees resigned and were replaced by the trustees of
the other institution.

Thus, one set of trustees would be responsible

for two corporate entities.

In the Parsons/New School merger, the

New School trustees took the place of Parson's trustees.

In the

Detroit/Davenport merger, the Davenport trustees replaced Detroit's
trustees.
For the Parsons/New School merger. Levy [1979] points out
several reasons and advantages for this alternative to the usual
consolidation.

They include the following:

protection of New School

from any potential financial liability arising from Parson's financial
problems; reduction in length of time to effectuate merger, a critical
consideration given Parsons' cash flow problems; elimination of any
jeopardy involving gifts to Parsons; and preservation of separate
faculties.

Levy concludes that this type of affiliation is a simple, less

costly technique which has almost all of the advantages of a regular
merger while eliminating most of its disadvantages.

Although he

concludes that he has not identified any negative effects of this
approach, there is the likelihood that the legal protection it affords
will probably fade as time passes.
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The Process and Organizational Change
The findings presented in this chapter indicate that a merger
is a complex series of actions that moves along a continuum from
initiation to implementation.

The findings also indicate that several

factors--the dominance of one of the partners, conflict resulting from
competing demands, organizational structure, type of leadership and
legal considerations--all significantly influenced and shaped the
process and the relationship between the merging institutions.
Each of the institutions in this study can be described as an
organization made up of coalitions composed of a number of
individuals and interest groups.

Boards of trustees, administrators,

faculty organizations, departments, student body, support staff and
alumni associations, all qualify as groups which make up an institution
of higher education.

Professional associations, community groups,

church organizations, government officials and boards are other groups
that interact with the institution.

In the merger process, these various

groups aligned themselves in various coalitions to advance their
particular interests.

Although there existed a variety of combinations

of groups in the mergers studied, the common denominator was that
various groups banded together on the basis of self-interest to
either promote or stop a merger.
The findings indicated that various individuals and groups
differed in their values, preferences, beliefs, information and
perceptions of the merger reality.

One group valued tradition and

mission, another valued land and expansion.
absorption, another preferred cooperation.

One preferred

One believed in a
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marriage of equals, the other acquisition.
another consultation.

One practiced secrecy,

One perceived salvation, another doom.

Coalitions with different agendas were present in each of the mergers.
In some instances, these differences were adjudicated by legal action.
Decisions in the mergers were reached through bargaining and
negotiation.
process.

Who got what was a critical question throughout the

What programs, faculty, staff and students would be

transferred were frequently debated.

What the name of the merged

institution would be was a major negotiating item for some.
conditions were renegotiated in many of the mergers.
arrangements were the major bargaining point for some.

Working

Financial
In all cases,

legislation and legal documents setting forth the outcome of bargaining
and negotiations were signed to consummate the mergers.
Because of differences between and among groups, power and
conflict characterized the merger process.

The presence of coalitions

with differing views motivated by self-interest fueled conflict.
Secrecy and the lack of adequate planning also contributed to the
degree of conflict.

The emergence of one institution as the dominant

entity in each of the mergers is an indication of the role of power in
the process.

The dominance factor also supports the political

perspective that in organizational change there are winners and losers.
This argument is reinforced by Schein's [1985] proposition that
organizational change is a revolutionary process when it results
in a loss of power on the part of one coalition.

To the less dominant or

acquired institutions in this study, the change brought about by the
merger process can certainly be described as revolutionary.

102

The process of merger, however, is not entirely explained by the
political perspective.

The drastic or revolutionary change visited upon

the institutions in this study was instituted in a top-down manner, a
characteristic of the structural perspective of organizations.

In each

instance, individuals or groups at the top of the administrative
hierarchy initiated the process and made the decision to enter into a
merger.

Leadership was exercised by key individuals at the top-

trustees, presidents or government officials.

Once decisions to merge

were made by these individuals or groups, they were handed down to
other groups within the organization to implement.

It was at this

point that coalition formation was most active and conflict intensified.
Bolman and Deal [1984] stated that within the political
perspective, top-down decision-making can undermine organizational
change.

Based on a pattern of unsuccessful efforts mounted by chief

executives, study teams and consultants, they concluded:
In every case, the mistake is to assume that a combination
of the right idea (as perceived by the person trying to make a
change) and legitimate authority is sufficient to produce change.
That assumption runs afoul of the political agendas and political
power of the . . . individuals and groups in middle and lower-level
positions in the organization who can devise a host of creative and
maddening ways to resist, divert, undermine, or ignore change
efforts, [p. 140]
Although the political view is the dominant perspective in
explaining the merger process, there is also evidence of the
effectiveness of utilizing strategies based on human resource
assumptions.

In some of the mergers, widespread consultation

through the utilization of commissions, task forces, committees and
less formal, decentralized approaches to implement the merger

103

decision is consistent with the human resource view that
participative management reduces the conflict between the needs
of the individuals and the needs of the organization to accomplish its
goal.

This approach was demonstrated to be successful in the Oregon

merger, but less successful in the District of Columbia merger.

Perhaps

the difference can be attributable to the perception of the individuals
involved in the former case that their ideas and feelings were being
heard whereas in the latter case, the participants did not feel they
exerted a strong influence in the decision-making process.
The involvement of participants in the implementation of the
merger process may be a case of too little, too late.

The process

utilized in the mergers may not have sufficiently unfroze the members
of the organizations to embrace the revolutionary change required by
a merger.

In the next chapter, the outcomes of the mergers will be

examined in this context.
Summary
The findings based on an analysis of case studies support the
conclusion presented in the literature that a merger is a complex
series of actions involving risk and other factors that affect
the process.

These findings, however, further identify the

merger process as a continuum from initiation to implementation.
As the merger moves along this continuum, several factors evolve
that significantly influence and shape the process and the
relationship between the merging institutions.
The most significant of these factors is the emergence of one
of the partners as the dominant force in the process.

This

dominance crosses over all categories of institutions—private
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and public.

The principal causative factor for the dominance, however,

is directly related to the type of institution and the reason for entering
into a merger.

In the private sector financial exigency not only

propelled institutions toward a merger, but also placed them in a
subordinate position to the financially stronger partner.

Reputations

and political power played a major role in establishing the dominate
partner in the mergers involving public institutions.

The dominance

factor significantly affected major negotiation issues involving the
name of merged institutions and the transfer of programs, staff
and

students.
Competing demands, exacerbated by the dominance factor,

created conflict as the process evolved.

The degree of secrecy

in the merger of private institutions also contributed to the conflict.
In these cases, the use of secrecy wras linked to the main reason for
initiating a merger, financial exigency.

In the mergers of public

institutions, on the other hand, wide-spread consultation was used to
manage conflict. In these cases, conflict w’as the inevitable result
stemming from an externally imposed merger.
Elements of organizational structure, planning and leadership
also emerged as factors which affected the process.

Less formal and

decentralized organizational structure facilitated change during the
initiation stages, whereas formal and centralized structure enhanced it
in the implementation stage.

Careful and structured planning was

absent in most of the mergers.

Extremely short implementation time

frames, resulting from a financial crisis in most instances, contributed
to this situation.

Leadership during the initiation stage was provided
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by key individuals in a variety of positions—presidents, trustees,
governors and legislators.
As the merger process unfolded, both usual and unexpected
legal issues emerged.

The latter category included lawsuits, sale of

assets and constitutional questions.

Two cases presented a different

merger arrangement that has been used in the corporate world.

It

involved maintaining the charters of both institutions under the
direction of a single board of trustees in order to avoid the timeconsuming and complex legal technicalities associated with a
traditional educational merger.
Viewed from a political perspective, the merger process is
explained in terms of coalitions forming around groups with differing
values, preferences and beliefs which bargain and negotiate over
issues of power.

Under this scenario, conflict arises because of

differing perceptions, self-interest of groups and scarce resources.
Although the merger process is basically political, decision¬
making at the initiation stage is top-down, a characteristic of the
structural approach to organizational management.

This conflicts with

the political process and hinders the implementation of change.

Wide¬

spread consultation, a characteristic of the human resource approach
to organizations, helped to reduce resistance to change in some of the
mergers.
Having explored both the reasons and process associated with the
mergers presented in the case studies, the outcomes of these mergers
will be examined in the next chapter.
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Note
1

The president of one or both institutions has been identified as
the key leader in the following mergers: University of the
District of Columbia [Taylor, 1978], Barrington/Gordon [Winfrey,
1989], Parson/New School [Levy, 1979], Wichita State University
[Greider, 1988] and LeMoyne/Owen [Searcy, 1981]. Governors
played key leadership roles in the mergers creating
Southeastern Massachusetts University [Zekan, 1990] and the
University of Wisconsin system [Heim, 1976]. In the
University of Lowell merger, a major leadership role was played
by a legislator [Zekan, 1990]. The chairman of the board of
trustees of Milwaukee-Downer College exercised the major role in
its merger with Lawrence College [Howard, 1980].

CHAPTER 4
OUTCOMES OF THE MERGERS
In Chapter 2, it was determined that the private institutions in
this study decided on a merger in order to avoid closure due to grave
financial difficulties.

By merging with a financially stronger

institution, these institutions hoped to save some vestige of their
identity and tradition.

In the public sector, the mergers were

instituted to accommodate public policy initiatives in an effort to
provide expanded educational opportunity and accountability.

In this

chapter, the mergers will first be examined to determine if these
institutional objectives were met.

It will conclude with an analysis of

the impact that the mergers had on participants, the causes of the
impacting factors and the methods utilized to control negative
outcomes.

The chapter will focus on the tension between

organizational ends and the needs of individuals.
Institutional Outcomes
Financial exigency was the major reason why the private
institutions in this study entered a merger.

By merging, they sought to

avoid bankruptcy and closure while at the same time continue some
form of their identity and heritage.
accomplishing these objectives?
with some qualifications.

Were they successful in

The answer in each case is yes, but

Although all of them avoided bankruptcy

and total elimination, some were more successful than others in
perpetuating their identity and heritage.

Most of them gained less

than they originally sought through merger and this contributed to the
displacement of faculty and students.

Certainly the dominance in
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negotiations of the financially stronger partner, as presented in
Chapter 3, played a major role in diminishing the original high
expectations of the financially troubled partner.

The following cases

illustrate both the positive outcomes and the less than expected results
of these mergers.
The degree to which the financially weaker institution was able
to continue its identity ranged from a significant retention of program,
staff and students in both the Parsons/New School and the New
College/South Florida mergers to virtually no trace of continuity in the
Westem/Miami merger.

In the Parsons/New School merger. Parsons

was retained as a fine arts college within New School and only seven
students withdrew as a result of the merger.

Additional income was

generated by raising tuition, creating an evening division and adding a
Bachelor of Fine Arts degree program.

Enrollment continued to grow

to the point that nine years after the merger, the president of the
merged institution considered Parsons a primary asset, a source of
viability and vitality for New School [Levy, 1979].

As was stated in a

previous chapter. Levy concluded that Parsons' program was
financially viable, only its management was poor.

This most likely

played a major role in the high degree of continuity.
Another institution that was able to retain its program and
identity to a great extent was New College.

In its merger with the

University of South Florida, it achieved its goal of maintaining the
integrity of an academic program, which emphasized independent
study and individualized instruction, by becoming an honors college
within the University of South Florida.

New College also retained most
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of its faculty and students.

The fact that New College merged with i

public institution, however, did significantly affect its governance and
operation.

There was a loss of institutional autonomy at trustee,

administrative and faculty levels coupled with the added
bureaucracy inherent in the public sector.

There also was a

reduction of the role of faculty in establishing education goals,
policies and procedures.

Student mix also changed, with some

reduction in selectivity.

Reed [1978] stated, however, that

reduced flexibility was a lesser evil than financial collapse.

He

concluded that the "blending of elitist and egalitarian forms
of educational philosophy appears to be achieving a stability of
operation” [p. 109].
Barrington College and Milwaukee-Downer College are two
examples of institutions that had to scale for less than they originally
hoped for as a result of merging with financially stronger partners.
Both were unable to negotiate a hyphenated named for the merged
institution in order to continue their identitv.

Both the mergers,

however, resulted in stronger succeeding institutions.

Winfrey [1989]

reported that the successor institution in the Barrington Gordon
merger attained financial stability*, strengthened its recruitment
position, enhanced its reputation and broadened its national visibility.
In his study of the Downer/Lawrence merger. Howard [1980]
concluded that 16 years after the merger, the overall correctness of
the decision was upheld.

Lawrence gained by the infusion of funds

from the sale of Downer’s property’ and the transfer of its endowment.
Downer was able to continue its name as a college within Laurence.
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The merger that resulted in the most striking loss of continuity
for the financially weaker partner was the one between Western and
Miami of Ohio.

Western originally entered the merger to avoid

bankruptcy and expected to continue its program as a college within
Miami.

The president of Western believed that the "preservation of

continuity is preferable to demise even if some autonomy is lost in
process" [Kennedy, 1975, p. 74].

Through the dominance of the process

by Miami as elaborated in Chapter 3, Western suffered, according to
Kennedy, a complete loss of identity in terms of its heritage and the
continuation of its faculty, students and staff.
Why did the above institutions, all of whom were facing
financial exigency, encounter varying degrees of difficulty in
trying to perpetuate their identity?

Kennedy's analysis

[1975] based on a comparison to a business model may help
answer this question.

He posits that if the weaker partner is

considered the seller and the stronger partner is the buyer, then
certain conclusions follow.

The buyer seeks to obtain the desirable

assets of the seller at the lowest possible cost.

Because the seller is

facing financial difficulty, the buyer can dominate the negotiations and
settle on terms that favor the buyer and frustrate the goals of the
seller.

In the Westem/Miami merger, Kennedy concluded that

Western bargained from financial weakness and Miami was interested
in obtaining land and facilities at bargain prices.

This conceptual

framework based on a business perspective can explain not only
Western's lack of success in continuing its program and identity, but
that of some of the other financially troubled private institutions
considered in this study.

This finding supports and further defines a

conclusion in the literature that a merger can result in a loss of
identity and autonomy and produce profound change for the less
dominant

partner.

In more political terms, the loss of identity and continuation of
programs by the financially weaker partner is an example of the
financially stronger partner marshalling its power to take advantage of
the situation.

In so doing, the stronger partner was able to bring this

power to bear during negotiations to enforce its demands.

The needs

of the stronger and weaker partners were different and in conflict
with each other.

The outcome was that the self-interest of the

financially stronger institution won out over the financially weaker
institution.
Another explanation of the difficulty in achieving continuity
can be drawn from Schien's [1985] theory on organizations.

He

maintained that when an organization can't grow because of a
saturated market or an obsolete product, there are two choices:

to

become adaptive through the transformation of organizational
culture or to destroy group culture through total reorganizationmerger, acquisition or bankruptcy.

The institutions which had

difficulty with continuity pursued the paradoxical position of
opting for merger while still trying to maintain a degree of their group
culture that contributed to their financial problems.

One can only

speculate that if they had been successful at adapting their
organizational culture, merger would not have been necessary.
The institutional outcomes for the merger of public institutions
considered in this study were positive for the most part.

As stated in

Chapter 2, the prime objectives in merging public institutions were to
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improve educational opportunity and accountability.

The Wisconsin

system merger illustrates the positive outcomes which can accrue from
a merger of public institutions.

Buchanan [1977] concluded that the

merger accomplished the major goals specified by the legislature.
They included an increased diversity of opportunity in programs and
degrees; cessation of program proliferation by instituting a continuity
of evaluation and providing necessary resources for viable programs;
protection of graduate and research programs; preservation of campus
autonomy and initiative by striking a balance between uniformity and
differences; and increased faculty time for teaching undergraduates.
She also concluded that the unified system gained in power rather
than lost power, which could have resulted from the efforts of
politicians to impose greater control through centralization.
In the merger that created the University of Arkansas at Pine
Bluffs, Neal [1978] found that following the merger, mission and
programs were expanded and physical facilities and funding were
improved.

This resulted in an increase in enrollment, a more

diversified student body, and an improvement in the quality of
faculty.

Greider [1988] found similar outcomes for the mergers of

municipal institutions with their state systems.

In the mergers that he

studied, all three of the former municipal institutions experienced an
enrollment growth rate greater than their sister institutions in the
state system.

They all continued to have strong ties to their local

communities and a focus on urban studies.

With the influx of state

funds, each institution benefited from lower tuition and increased
compensation for faculty.
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The mergers of Massachusetts institutions studied by Zekan
[1990] also illustrate the positive outcomes for institutions and
the citizens which they serve.

In the merger that created

Southeastern Massachusetts University, he found that educational
opportunity beyond textile and engineering programs was provided
for citizens of the area.

Students also were pleased in so far as the

merger would lead to an institution with more prestige.

The merger

that created the University of Lowell also resulted in expanded
programs and opportunities for citizens in its service area.

This was

also true for the merger of Blue Hills and Massasoit Community
College.

Even in the highly controversial Boston State/UMass merger,

Zekan concluded from a perspective 8 years after the merger, that it
can be judged as successful in the attainment of its goals.

The merger

resulted in a quality baccalaureate education in the City of Boston with
no program redundancy.
The results of the mergers of public institutions were not
completely positive.

The types of change required to effectuate

a merger can have a significant impact on the way an institution
conducts its business.

Chief among these change factors is an

increase in bureaucracy.

In the Oregon merger, McMahon [1984]

found that the consolidation produced a significant increase in
rules of operation resulting in a proliferation of written policies and
procedures.

When the three municipal institutions became part of

their state system, Greider [1988] found that each experienced an
increase of bureaucracy and a loss of autonomy.

This change in

decision-making made it much harder to reach consensus on issues.
He made the analogy that the municipals found themselves to be new
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members of an existing family.

He concluded, however, that the

financial gain for these institutions outweighed their loss of autonomy.
With respect to outcomes, public institutions shared some of
the same fate as private institutions.

Evidence that public

institutions do not attain all of their merger goals is found in the
consolidation that created the University of the District of Columbia.
Some participants criticized the merger as only an administrative
consolidation [Taylor, 1978].

This could possibly lead to a

fragmentation that would jeopardize attaining the merger goal of
eliminating program duplication.

In fact, Dillworth [1981] concluded

that after the merger, the successor institution was still plagued by the
same problems of program duplication and poor coordination.

There is

also evidence that public institutions may suffer the same negative
outcome that the private institutions experienced.

In the study of the

merger of two unnamed public institutions. Cannon [1977] found that
both institutions suffered a loss of institutional identity.

This was

a significant negative outcome for some of the private institutions
examined in this study.
Buchanan [1977] in studying the Wisconsin merger concluded
that no one got quite what was wanted, but no one lost all that
was feared.

Perhaps this resulted from the attitude expressed by

one chancellor that once the merger bills were passed "we have to
make it work.

My faculty are all pragmatists" [p. 350].

Although

Buchanan concluded that the merger accomplished its goals, it was not
a complete success.

She found that rivalry still exists and some

chancellors still undercut the system president with the legislature
and continue to build separate power bases.

The human elements of
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power and pragmatism certainly played a role in the outcome of this
merger.

It is interesting to note that, as was stated in Chapter 2, these

same two elements played a role in causing the merger.
The Wisconsin case serves as a prime example of how
institutional outcomes are affected by politics.

The alignment of

various groups during the negotiation process brought power to bear
on the various negotiation issues.

The conclusion that no one got

everything desired nor lost all that was feared demonstrates the
skillful use of power in reaching compromises.

The fact that after the

merger, as before, some players continue to build coalitions and power
for the next round of organizational conflict is testimony to the
political environment of higher education.
The political perspective maintains that there are winners
and losers in the conflict brought about by competing demands for
scarce resources.

Organizational theory also posits that there is a

classic tension between structure and people, between the
organization and the individual.

In this context, Schuman [1978]

argued that the individual is "divided, manipulated, and finally
conquered for organizational ends" [p. 82].

Knowing that

organizations in this study have accomplished most of their
institutional objectives for a merger, the question must be asked
and answered—what was the effect on the individuals who make up
the

organizations?
The Human Element
Merger participants, namely faculty, staff, trustees, students,

and government officials, play a significant role in the initiation,
implementation and outcome of a merger.

The reviewed literature
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indicates that if a merger is to be successful in effectively
accomplishing its objectives, then the human element must be
considered. In this section, the way the mergers affect individuals will
be examined not only in the context of how these effects relate to
organizational ends, but also how they affect the individual as a
person.
Although most of the case studies did not specifically address the
impact of a merger on participants, evidence of negative effects was
found in the descriptive material presented in several of the studies.
Evidence of significant negative impact on faculty was found in Zekan's
study [1990] of the Boston State/UMass, Boston merger.

He found that

the merger "engendered in those who participated...such a strong
anger and sense of unfairness that it lingers today, eight years after
the fact" [p. 48].

Under the merger, UMass, Boston was able to choose

the Boston State faculty that it wanted.

Other state colleges and

universities also could choose faculty members who were left.

More

than twenty Boston State faculty selected early retirement rather than
relocate.
In response to one of the initial merger proposals, a faculty
leader at Boston State attacked the proposal as mechanistic.

He

claimed faculty, students and staff were treated as movable parts
in a reorganized factory [Zekan, 1990].

This foreshadowed what

would eventually happen to the faculty as a result of the final
merger.

Zekan concluded that "the poor treatment of the

individuals involved...resulted in a merger that deeply effected
[sic] the lives of many people" [p. 80].

He further stated that

many faculty members at Boston State believed that the status quo
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would be maintained and that the college would not close.
Because of their powerlessness to influence the merger decision,
Zekan concluded that this gave rise to anger.
careers were altered as a result of the merger.

In addition, many
He found that

eight years after the fact, former Boston State employees were
spread throughout the system and still carried the anger of their
treatment with them.

It should be noted, however, that despite

the impact on participants, he judged the merger to be successful
on the basis that it resulted in a quality baccalaureate education
without redundancy in the city of Boston.
Both the Western/Miami and Downer/Lawrence studies also
presented evidence of hardships for faculty and students.

Most

Western faculty and the vast majority of its students did not transfer
to Miami [Kennedy, 1975].

This certainly produced hardship and

anger on their part as there was little help in relocating.

Difficulties

were not limited to the weaker partner according to Kennedy.

The

role of the Western program remnants within Miami continued to
evoke embittered feelings among Miami faculty and staff.

Although

most Downer faculty and students transferred to Lawrence, the
announcement of the merger was devastating to them and resulted in
shocked disbelief [Howard, 1980].
there.

The negative effects did not stop

Howard reported that 18 years after the merger, Lawrence

trustees initially denied permission for his study because they thought
that the interviewing of people "ran the serious risk of stirring up old
antagonisms.

Of immediate concern was the possibility that

aggravated memories might provoke the changing of wills and
bequests" [p. 8].

Both fears and negative feelings evidently die hard.
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Even when a merger is consummated with a great deal of
cooperation or with little change in faculty or student standing,
anxiety and fear can be present.

In the Barrington/Gordon

merger, which was negotiated with a high degree of mutual trust,
Winfrey [1989] found that all Barrington constituents went
through a grieving process.
most seriously affected.

She reported that its alumni was the

They felt angry and betrayed and were

still bitter after the merger.

This supports the literature finding that

participants in a merger suffer the same symptoms of grief, which
includes anger and depression, they would experience over the loss of
anything held to be important.

In the merger of municipal institutions

with state systems, which maintained the status of faculty and
students, Greider [1988] concluded that turmoil and anxiety were also
present.
In addition to the obvious anger and anxiety that anyone
would experience if continued employment were threatened, changes
in working conditions resulting from a merger also produce a variety
of fears.

In the study of the Wisconsin system merger, Carothers

[1974] found that the faculty of the University of Wisconsin at
Madison feared the loss of quality, prestige, academic freedom and
faculty control.

The faculty in the Wisconsin State University system

feared the deterioration of excellent undergraduate teaching.
working conditions are highly valued by faculty members.

All these
The threat

of losing them would certainly arouse deep anger and anxiety.
Now that it has been demonstrated that evidence in the case
studies support the literature's contention that a merger can
produce anger and anxiety for participants, the question becomes
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what causes these negative outcomes?
indicated two possible explanations.

The literature review

In some mergers, the

employment of secrecy and the resulting surprise announcements
can send shock waves through a community.

Initial disbelief

rapidly gives way to anger followed by anxiety concerning future
status.

Downer College and Western College were prime examples

of this phenomena.

A second explanation stems from the widely

held assumption that colleges are not suppose to fail.

In this

context, merger is viewed as an attack on stability, a cherished
virtue in higher education.

Anger is evoked in defense of alma

mater and a sense of agony and powerlessness evolves.

The Boston

State/UMass, Boston merger is an example of this scenario.
A more definitive explanation of what causes the anger and
anxiety in participants is provided by Turk [1989].

He maintains that

individuals have a perception of reality that enables them to select
what to perceive and how to interpret it.

This forms a frame of

reference that allows the individuals to understand what happens in
their lives and what to expect in the future.

The frame of reference

enables individuals to reduce feelings of uncertainty and maintain a
sense of control.

When a major change such as a merger disrupts the

frame of reference, the individual is faced with inconsistencies
between what was expected and what is perceived.

This produces

uncertainty and stress for the individual.
How individuals react to the uncertainty produced by the
disruption between expectations and events varies.

According to Turk

[1989], individuals' reactions can be grouped under two categories—
danger and opportunity.

Individuals within what he calls the danger
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the danger category employ defensive mechanisms to reinforce their
frame of reference and deny forces of change as long as possible on
the grounds that it is not needed.

They can become hostile,

argumentative, angry and depressive concerning the organizational
change because they are not prepared for the disruption of their
expectations.

Individuals in the opportunity category, on the other

hand, view the disruption as an unpleasant but necessary part of the
adjustment process.

They accept change and its uncertainty as a

natural part of living and a challenge to conquer.

This is in contrast to

the individuals in the danger category who deny the uncertainty and
react by blaming and resisting.

The high level of ambiguity present in

a merger situation can exacerbate this type of behavior.
One case study gives additional insights on not only how a
merger impacts on faculty and administrators, but also why
negative feelings are exacerbated by perceptions.

Cannon's

descriptive case study [1977] on the merger of two public institutions,
labeled Eastern State College and Eastern Technological Institute,
focused on the interaction of the individual and the organization.

It

probed the subjective perception of participants concerning the
merger, their psychological reactions in response to their perceptions,
and the organizational and individual consequences of the merger.
Data on perceptions and experiences were collected by questionnaires
administered to participants at both pre-merger and post-merger
stages.

Data on the consequences were drawn from the findings

obtained from the questionnaire.
Specifically, the study considered the perceptions of the
merger by participants and their merger-related experiences
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dealing with job satisfaction, role tension, merger anxiety and
merger satisfaction.

Job satisfaction was defined as the degree
■

of satisfaction with intrinsic (type of work, autonomy, interpersonal
relations) and extrinsic (salary, influence, career progression,
promotion) aspects of work.

Role tension was identified as conflicts,

overload and ambiguities related to the job.

Merger anxiety referred

to conflicting organizational realities and ambiguities generated by the
merger.

Merger satisfaction was defined as being pleased with the

merger and organizational change.

Because of the importance of

participants in determining the successful outcome of a merger and
the scant information about this in the merger literature, Cannon's
findings will be presented in detail.
With regard to perceptions, a significant change took place
between pre-merger and post-merger periods for Eastern State
College participants.

They appraised the event as a "marriage of

equals" at pre-merger and "an acquisition of Eastern State by
Eastern Tech" at post-merger [Cannon, 1977, p. 153].

Eastern

State participants also perceived that their institution was held
in less esteem by employees of Eastern Tech.

Changes in job

satisfaction also occurred between pre- and post-merger periods.
Greater job dissatisfaction was reported for Eastern State
than for Eastern Tech.
State administrators.

The greatest change took place for Eastern
They reported decreased satisfaction with both

intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of their work.

Cannon [1977] reported

that the pre-merger perceptions of a marriage of equals raised
expectations for better working conditions, salary equalization and
equitable treatment.

Post-merger findings, however, indicated that
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these expectations did not materialize.

She offered this as proof that

Eastern State was the acquired member and played a less dominant
role.

She concluded that "these organizational realities, in and of

themselves, serve to explain the greater job dissatisfaction
experienced by Eastern State College respondents" [p. 179].
When Cannon [1977] compared role tension of participants to
their perceptions of merger, she found that being the acquired
member helped to explain the differences between groups.

She found

that persons in the acquired category experienced a consistently
higher role tension rating.

She concluded that a merger dominated by

one of the partners "plays a vital role in contributing to the anxieties
and tensions experience by the participants" [pp. 212-213].

The

source of this tension usually came from the sister institution or
colleagues at the sister institution.

Pressure from this source created

job difficulties for persons who were threatened by the merger.
Anxiety and satisfaction with respect to the merger also changed
over time for Eastern State respondents.

From pre- to post-merger

periods, they reported increased merger anxiety and decreased
merger satisfaction.

This may have resulted from lowered satisfaction

with the aspects of work and the changing features of the organization.
Cannon [1977] concluded that this is "especially true when participants
feel that they are being acquired by the more dominant institution of
the merger pair" [p. 228].
In addition to institutional affiliation, Cannon [1977] found that
two other groupings experienced negative impact in the post merger
stage.

Faculty members and administrators who were employed in

over-lapping positions between the two institutions experienced
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increased role tension and decreased job satisfaction.

Even some

faculty in non-overlapping positions reported increased merger
anxiety and dissatisfaction.

She attributed this to the possibility that

they were influenced by institutional changes caused by the merger.
In addition, administrators experienced more negative impact than
others faced based on their reports of increased merger anxiety and
dissatisfaction.

Cannon concluded that this resulted from the fact that

administrative reorganization took the longest period of time to
accomplish.
The major finding of Cannon’s study [1977] is that the most
salient determinant of the effects of the merger on participants was
their affiliation with either the dominant or subordinate partner.

She

concluded:
The delay in resolving organizational ambiguities and
inequities had detrimental effects upon the professional
staff during the pre- and post-merger process.
Specifically, perceptions of Eastern State College as
the "acquired” member of the merger pair and Eastern
Technological Institute as the "acquirer" resulted in
different merger experiences.
Thus, the consequences of
merger for the participant are manifested in the
post-merger reports of job dissatisfaction, merger
anxiety, role tension and merger dissatisfaction. These
expectations were more pronounced for Eastern State
College participants—the acquired members,
[p. 241]
In a later paper, Cannon [1983] further concluded that
employees view a merger as a major life change that negatively
affects their behavior.

Citing behavioral scientists, she theorizes that

this results from the perception of participants that the change will
prevent them from satisfying their own needs.

They thus learn to

associate anxiety, frustration and fear with change.

This perceived

12-

link will also increase the possibility thai individuals will resist future
organizational changes.
There is ample evidence presented here on the tension between
organizational objectives and the well being of involved individuals.
Regardless if the negative outcomes resulted from a learned response
from previous experience, a reaction to a disruption of control, a
failure of authorities to manage effectively the transition stage of
change or the failure of groups to form coalitions to affect decisions in
an effective manner, individuals suffered as the organizations
accomplished merger objectives.

It is possible that Sc hum an s [19~8]

contention that the individual is divided and conquered for
organizational ends applies to individuals involved in a merger of
institutions of higher education.
Knowing that negative outcomes for individuals stem from a
merger, are there ways in which these outcomes can be controlled or
diminished?

The literature review indicated that how participants feel

about merger is affected by their basic belief concerning how things
should be done.

Thus the culture of the organization, that is.

individual and collective behaviors, beliefs and assumptions of
participants, must be taken into consideration.

It was stated in the

review that turmoil, confusion and tension of employees can undo the
most carefully planned financial merger.

In order to provide a smooth

transition in dealing with employee issues, the literature indicates that
communication mechanisms, transition teams, morale boosting
activities, counseling and workshops should be utilized.

Cannon [19S5]

also cited the applicability of applied behavioral strategies in coping
with negative reactions.

They included strategic kinds of
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interorganizational communications and perceptive human resource
planning.

She maintained that in order to "reduce employees' fears,

combat shock/disbelief, and diffuse anger, management needs to
recognize merger as a process demanding planned and preventive
action" [p. 12].
Evidence of the utilization of some of these human resource
strategies to overcome fear and anxiety experienced by
participants has been identified in four of the case studies.

Brown

[1987], in his study of the Detroit-Davenport merger, reported that it
takes time for participants to become comfortable and secure within a
merger situation.

He concluded that the natural fear and anxiety

resulting from a merger can be overcome by face-to-face contact,
which will increase communication.

He further recommends that after

a merger, management should focus its efforts on decreasing these
natural tendencies because people can not be expected to work on
long-range goals when they feel insecure.

In the Oregon merger,

McMahon [1984] found that the use of transition teams to work out
conflicts with those involved contributed to positive attitudes.
Kennedy [1975], in studying the problems associated with the
Western-Miami merger, also concluded that effective communication
can overcome resistance to integration.
information can help.

Even communication of basic

In a survey of participants in the merger that

created the University of the District of Columbia, Taylor [1978] found
that over 80% of the respondents were of the opinion that the
education of constituencies as to the advantages and disadvantages of
consolidation would have alleviated much anxiety.
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These four case study findings support the following contention of
Bolman and Deal [1984]:
The human resource frame suggests that there are
fundamental conflicts between individual and organization
but that those conflicts can be reduced, if not reconciled,
through greater levels of collaboration and learning, more
meaningful work, and genuine exercise of participation in
important decisions, [p. 132]
Summary
The mergers examined in this study accomplished their
institutional objectives.

The private institutions were able to avoid

bankruptcy and total dissolution.

They experienced varying degrees

of difficulty, however, in continuing their heritage and identity and
attained less in this regard than they originally sought.
contributed to a displacement of faculty and students.

This
A possible

reason for these difficulties was that because of financial exigency,
these institutions were cast in a subordinate role during negotiations.
In business terms, they were sellers in a buyer's market.

In the

political perspective, they did not have the power to affect the
outcome.

One notable exception to this pattern occurred when a

troubled institution was able to negotiate a unique funding
arrangement with the stronger partner.

A second exception occurred

when the subordinate institution's program became financially viable
under new management.

In both cases, a high degree of continuity

was achieved.
For public institutions, the merger goal of meeting public
policy initiatives to expand educational opportunity was attained.
Increased bureaucracy and loss of autonomy, however, were evident
in many of these mergers.

Some public institutions also shared in the
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loss of identity syndrome experienced by the private institutions. The
use of political power to affect outcomes was significant.
Although the mergers in this study accomplished their
institutional objectives, they were attained at a cost to the participants.
This is a classic example of tension between the organization and the
individual. Regardless of the type of institutional control or reason for
entering into a merger, people were affected in negative ways.

Anger,

bitterness, fear and anxiety were documented in many of the studies.
These negative outcomes may stem from factors other than the basic
threat of displacement and altered working conditions.

The use of

secrecy, assumptions that colleges are not supposed to fail and reaction
to the disruption of personal control all could have played a role.

One

significant study found that the conditions of merger affect
participants' perception of the event and also cause job dissatisfaction,
role tension, merger anxiety and decreased satisfaction with the
merger.

This is particularly true for members of the less dominant or

acquired

institution.

The literature and case studies presented several strategies to
cope with these negative effects.

The culture of the organization,

human dynamics, communication and human resource planning all
should be considered.

Natural fear and anxiety of participants can be

lessened by involving participants in decisions, educating them as to
the advantages and disadvantages of a merger and face-to-face
communication.
The two previous chapters and this one have presented
findings on the reasons, process and outcomes of the 20 mergers.
In the final chapter, these findings will be integrated in order to

128

form conclusions and develop recommendations for individuals
involved in a merger of institutions of higher education.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the merger of higher educational institutions occurs on a
regular basis and is considered an acceptable option to respond to
change, research on the subject is fragmented.

As stated in the

Introduction, the purpose of this study is to investigate the mergers of
institutions of higher education in order to develop an integrated
understanding of this organizational phenomena.

Specifically, the

study identifies and compares the reasons for, the process used in and
the outcomes of various mergers that have taken place and
synthesizes these findings with the current literature on the subject.
The findings are interpreted so that strategies grounded in the data
can be developed to assist policy makers and other participants in a
merger

situation.

The findings presented in the previous chapters indicate that the
lack of understanding of the elements and tensions of the merger
phenomenon, particularly the dynamics of change, often creates
implementation problems.

Change plays a major role in the three

basic tensions that characterize the reasons, process and outcomes of
the mergers.

When the reasons for the mergers are analyzed, the

classic tension between forces for change and the forces to maintain
the status quo within the organization becomes evident.

The merger

process itself is characterized by the tension of one institution
becoming dominant thereby exacerbating the impact of change on the
subordinate institution.

The process is also characterized by how

various groups react to change.

As for the outcomes of the mergers.
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the accomplishing of organizational ends at the expense of the needs of
individuals in a changing work environment is a defining tension.
In addition to change and its tensions, other elements that
constitute the mergers have been identified in the previous chapters.
They include use of power, decision-making, crisis, conflict, planning
and implementation factors.

How these elements affect the merger

process and relate to the major tensions are synthesized in the
conclusions section that follows.

Important distinctions are also noted.

Based on this understanding of the merger phenomenon,
recommendations on management strategies addressing change are
formulated to assist policy makers and administrators in making the
merger process smoother and more effective.
Conclusions
In the Review of Literature, it was stated that the problems in a
merger situation are so idiosyncratic that each merger must be treated
differently.

Based on this study, however, some important

generalizations concerning common characteristics have emerged.
This commonality exists in each of the major merger elements:
change, crisis, use of power, decision-making, conflict, objectives,
outcomes and management.

Although these characteristics do not

occur in every merger, their frequency presents a pattern which is of
importance.
The merger of institutions of higher education involves first and
foremost significant change brought about by economic, social and
political factors.

For the institutions, the changes include replacing one

corporate governing body with another, the transformation of identity,
the addition and deletion of programs, the adoption of new procedures
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and the expansion of facilities.

The resulting merged institutions are

different than the predecessor institutions.

For the individuals

involved, the mergers create a threat to their sense of control of what
is happening in their lives, which in turn leads to anger, anxiety and
bitterness.
occur.

For some staff, displacement or loss of employment may

For those employees who remain, the merger can affect job

satisfaction.
Although the private and public institutions entered their
mergers for different reasons, the decision makers in both categories
were confronted with the classic tension between forces for change
and forces to maintain the status quo within the organization.

For the

private institutions, this tension manifested itself in the desire to
maintain traditional mission and programs in the face of shrinking
resources.

For the public institutions, the tension took the form of

meeting external policy needs versus maintaining existing academic
interests.

The merger of institutions of higher education is an example

of how various political, social and economic factors change the status
quo in American higher education.

Except for closing, the resulting

change is probably the most drastic one experienced by the institution
and the individuals involved.
A second significant characteristic of the mergers of institutions of
higher education is that the use of power plays a critical role in the
process.

As the merger process moves along a continuum from

initiation to implementation, the role of power significantly affects
actions and outcomes of the mergers.

Because of financial resources,

size, political savvy or reputation, one of the partners emerges as the
dominant player in the negotiations.

In competing to promote
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institutional self-interest within the context of scarce resources, the
more powerful partner is in a stronger position to negotiate terms
favorable to itself and to exacerbate the negative aspects of change for
the subordinate institution.

The less powerful partner loses out on

attaining all of its original objectives for entering a merger.

As a seller

in a buyer's market, the weaker institution lacks the power to promote
its self-interest.

The participants associated with the less powerful

institution suffer a greater degree of anxiety and dissatisfaction.

If the

participants had been more aware of the political aspects of change,
they may have been in a better position to negotiate a more favorable
outcome for their institution and constituent groups.
Crisis is the third characteristic that is usually part of the merger
process.

For the private institutions, financial exigency can result from

poor planning or management in response to changing demographic
factors.

In the public sector, the intervention of external entities

desiring more opportunity for citizens or control of educational
organizations introduces a degree of instability over impending change
in the traditional role of the institution.

Employees face the crisis of

losing their jobs or adjusting to sudden changes in the ways things are
done.

Students also face the crisis of adjusting to a new environment

or withdrawing.

Because of crisis, the institutions and constituent

groups are placed in a position of reacting to change as opposed to
managing it.
The top-down method of making decisions, the fourth
characteristic prevalent in the mergers, further exacerbates the
reactionary mode for the institutions and their constituencies.

The

upper levels of the hierarchy in making the decision to merge are
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usually sufficiently informed on the factors creating the conditions for
a merger.

The rest of the organization, however, is often not

sufficiently informed or involved to foster an acceptance of the reality
of merger and its changes.

This results in various constituent groups

developing different perspectives of the merger.
group becomes an overriding concern.

The interest of each

The lack of consultation and

meaningful participation contributes to resistance rather than
receptiveness on the part of constituent groups.

The way the decisions

are reached and the lack of attention to the dynamics of
implementation do not unfreeze an entire organization for the drastic
changes required by a merger.

These factors certainly play a

significant role in forming coalitions, creating conflict, diminishing
institutional outcomes and causing personal anger and bitterness.

A

different approach, one addressing organizational and human
dynamics, could greatly reduce the negative outcomes for both the
institutions and the individuals involved.
Finally, the story of the mergers in this study is, for the most pan,
one of poor planning and management.

For many of the institutions,

their original objectives for entering a merger were not completely
met.

For many of the individuals involved, the merger process was a

traumatic experience.

Institutional ends were given more

consideration than the needs of individuals in a changing
organizational environment.

The lack of sufficient planning and

effective implementation strategies played a major role in producing
these negative outcomes.

It resulted in institutions resisting change,

being divided by conflict, reacting to crisis in a hasty, unilateral
manner and ignoring the needs of the individual.

A merger was not
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viewed as a process, but as an event that ended all too frequently with
the signing of the merger document.

The strong leadership present in

the initiation stage apparently ended during the implementation stage.
Although change, conflict and crisis can be good for an organization
and its constituencies, they must be managed within a planning
context in order to avoid or lessen their negative impacts and risk.
This is especially true in a merger situation where the change can be a
drastic one.

The reasons that the institutions poorly managed the

merger process may stem from their lack of an appropriate planning
mechanism and administrators adept at using organizational change
strategies

effectively.

Table 1 presents a summary of the specific conclusions according
to the prevalent characteristics of the various elements of the merger
process.

Table 1
Merger Conclusions by Process Elements
Element

Prevalent

Characteristics

Change
Power
Decision-making
Crisis
Conflict
Objectives
Participants
Planning
Implementation

Not managed
Dominance/hierarchical
Top down and self-centered
Not anticipated
Divisiveness
Organizational ends overriding
Individual needs neglected
Non-existent or poorly done
Limited or no strategies to facilitate
process
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The analysis of dissertation case studies provides several
important distinctions concerning the merger phenomenon.
the dissertations serve as a valuable research resource.

As such,

The fact that

they are not cited in the merger literature indicates an incompleteness
in that literature.

Public policy initiatives in contrast to financial

exigency were the reasons for the merger of public and private
institutions respectively.

Dominant institutions saw a merger as a

takeover to effectuate a financial gain at bargain prices.

The

subordinate institution viewed a merger as a marriage with the
expectation of equal treatment and the avoidance of bankruptcy.
Analysis of the case studies demonstrated that a merger is a
process with distinct stages—initiation and implementation.

As the

merger process unfolded, differences also manifested themselves
according to the type of control of the participating institutions.
Within the private sector, the decision-making process was usually
characterized by secrecy.

In the public sector, consultation with

various internal and external groups usually took place.
risk also differed within each sector.

The type of

For the private institution, the

risk for the merged institution centered on remaining financially
viable while trying to continue some form of identity of the
predecessor institutions.

For the public institution, the risk involved

loss of control and the possible lowering of standards.

With respect to

the outcomes of the mergers, differences were again present according
to the type of control.

In the private sector, the weaker institutions

avoided bankruptcy but had limited success in attaining the goal of
perpetuating their identities and programs.

In the public sector.
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educational opportunity was expanded and accountability increased
while bureaucracy was increased and autonomy decreased.
The dissertation case studies also provided this study with data
on five mergers that were exceptions to conventional wisdom or
normal patterns.

In two cases, financially troubled institutions

(Barrington/Gordon and Lemoyne/Owen) merged successfully,
contrary to the advice presented in the literature that two institutions
in financial difficulty should not enter a merger.

In another case, a

financially troubled private institution (New College) was able to
maintain a substantial portion of its identity and programs by
providing a unique funding mechanism after its merger.

This

accomplished what many other financially weak institutions were
unable to achieve.

The fourth and fifth cases (Parsons/New School and

Detroit/Davenport) provided information on how a merger avoided
costly delays by utilizing a simple legal maneuver affecting the
governing board that is frequently employed in the corporate world.
Based on the enriched understanding of the totality of the merger
phenomenon embodied in the conclusions of this study,
recommendations can now be formulated to guide policy makers,
implementors and participants involved in a merger situation.
Recommendations
This study has concluded that the mergers of institutions of
higher education involve drastic change, dominating use of power,
conflict, hierarchical decision-making, crisis situations and institutional
ends accomplished at the expense of individuals.

It also concluded

that the mergers have been poorly planned and managed leading to
negative results.

To assist policy makers and implementors, the
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recommendations of this study must address poor planning and
implementation and the other negative aspects listed in Table 1.

They

are intended to help guide decision makers and implementors in their
thinking and actions in coping with change in a merger situation.
They are not intended to serve as a step-by-step recipe for rigid
implementation.
situation.

Some recommendations may not apply to every

All of them, however, offer strategies that could facilitate

the merger process for both the institution and the individual if
utilized in the appropriate case.
The application of management strategies should facilitate the
changes required by a merger, thereby avoiding the negative
outcomes so frequently experienced in past mergers.

One

management strategy adapted from the work of Bolman and Deal
[1984], can be particularly helpful in managing change.

They

recommend that managers utilize strategies in an integrated manner
from four frames—structural, human resources, political and
symbolic—to deal with various situations in order to understand and
manage organizations.
The structural frame, which is concerned with formal roles and
relationships, is appropriate to promote goal direction, structural
clarity and task accomplishment.

The human resource frame, which

attempts to tailor organizations to people, is used to respond
effectively to human needs.

The political frame, which addresses the

issues of power and influence among individuals and groups, is used to
deal with coalitions, conflicts and problems of resource allocation. The
symbolic frame, which holds that ritual and culture propel the
organization, is appropriate for considering aspects involving shared
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values, symbols and cohesion.

For Bolman and Deal [1984], each frame

has its own view and interpretation of reality.

They maintain that

successful managers blend the four frames and use them in such a
way that they are mutually supporting.
various

Table 2 summarizes the

frames.

Table 2
Summary of Organizational Frames [Bolman and Deal, 1984]
Organizational Domain

Frame

Emphasis

Structural

Formal roles
and relationships

Goal direction and
task accomplishment

Human Resource

Tailor organization
to people

Human needs

Political

Power and influence

Coalitions, conflicts
and resources

Symbolic

Ritual and culture

Shared values
symbols and
cohesion

In a merger situation, administrators must facilitate change and
must be able to recognize and accept the existence of multiple
perspectives.

A merger will be interpreted in a number of different

ways by various individuals and groups involved in the process.

By

accepting this assumption, administrators will be able to understand
better how people will react and will be able to utilize strategies
drawn from the appropriate frame to facilitate change.

For example,

during the initiation stage of the merger process, the involvement of
constituent groups in the decision-making process (sharing of power in
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the political frame) could be used to discuss the feasibility of the
merger and other alternatives.

This could be accomplished through

the use of decentralized and less formal meetings (structural frame)
that are of an ad hoc nature.

This would provide a forum to facilitate

the discussion of human needs and concerns (human resources frame)
associated with drastic change.

For some participants, this will

represent a ritual (symbolic frame) to signal responsibility and to
provide an opportunity to negotiate meaning.
By utilizing strategies from the four frames, the decision-making
process will be viewed by participants according to their particular
frame:

as a rational sequence to produce "right" decisions leading to a

realignment of responsibilities in the new environment (structural); as
an open process to produce commitment based on a balance between
human needs and formal roles (human resource); as an opportunity to
gain or exercise power involving new coalitions (political); or as a
ritual to provide comfort and support until the merger occurs by
maintaining an image of accountability and responsiveness (symbolic).
Having participated in the decision, individuals and groups should be
more receptive to change in that they view the reorganization as
satisfying their particular perspective of what should or is happening.
During the implementation stage, the involvement of participants
in the process through the utilization of strategies based on the four
frames should continue.

Formal committees should be utilized to

transmit facts and information to make decisions on implementation
issues (structural) and to provide a vehicle for influencing others and
gaining support for a group's particular self-interest (political).
Informal sessions should also be provided to enable participants to
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exchange information and share feelings (human resource) and to
facilitate the transformation of the organizational culture (symbolic).
These strategies should help to manage conflict in that participants
will view the process as resolving conflict according to their particular
perspective:

by formal authority (structural); by developing

relationships resulting from individuals confronting conflict (human
resources); by developing power through bargaining (political); or by
using conflict to negotiate meaning (symbolic).

Table 3 on the next

page summarizes these perceptions according to the four frames and
organizational processes.
The skillful use of the integrated frame strategies could create an
organizational culture that would be more open to and accommodating
of change.

If the basic beliefs, norms and values as well as practices

and behaviors of the individuals in the organization are examined and
attended to by these strategies, then resistance to change could be
greatly diminished.

If an institution can create an organizational

culture that is accepting of change, then it would be continually
involved in self-renewal which may help the organization avoid many
of the negative conditions that force institutions into a merger.

At the

very least, it could facilitate the changes required of the individuals
and institutions involved in a merger.

Of course, this goal of a self-

renewing institution accepting of change could be attained through the
application of other management strategies.
strategy is but one possible approach.

The integrated frame

The important point is that

institutions should be guided by a vision and management plan that
will facilitate acceptance of the vision and its changes and guide the
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Table 3
Summary of Perceptions by Frames and Organizational Processes
[Bolman and Deal, 1984]

Frame

Decisions

Reorganization

Structural

Rational sequence to
reach right decision

Realign roles
to fit task

Human
Resource

Open process to
produce commitment

Balance human
needs and
formal roles

Political

Opportunity to gain
or exercise power

Redistribute
power and form
new coalitions

Symbolic

Ritual to provide comfort
and support until decision
made

Maintain image
of accountability
and responsive¬
ness

Frame

Meetings

Conflict

Structural

Formal committees to
to make decisions

Resolve by
formal authority

Human
Resource

Informal sessions to
exchange information
and share feelings

Develop
relationships
by confronting it

Political

Formal committees to
make points and
influence others

Develop power
through
bargaining

Symbolic

Informal sessions to
transform culture

Opportunity
to negotiate
meaning
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institution through the initiation, implementation and follow-up
stages.
There are certainly problems associated with changing the
organizational culture of an institution of higher education to make it
more accommodating of change.

Cultural change within an

organization is a lengthy and time consuming process.
accomplished as a quick fix for a crisis.

It cannot be

Also, not every member of the

institution can be or is motivated to be involved in the process to
change the organization.

Under the integrated frame approach, the

tension between the forces for maintaining the status quo and change
will still exist.

The use of the integrated strategy, however, should

minimize organizational disruption.

It provides the opportunity for

individuals with different perspectives to present their concerns and
to work out differences within a context appropriate to their frame of
reference.
There are other management strategies that could be utilized to
help institutions avoid or minimize the problems associated with a
merger.

One such strategy would be to evaluate the current

management of an institution with the goal of making it more efficient.
Management strategies utilized in business, such as a customer service
orientation, total quality management, marketing strategies,
program/staff reduction and the expanded use of information
technology could be implemented to streamline operations, cut costs
and increase productivity.

In a merger, the bargaining position is

enhanced when the participating institutions are more viable.
Institutions ought to monitor their operation for signs that could
indicate a future crisis.

These signs include a mission that is no longer
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viable, objectives not being met because of scarce resources, decline in
in enrollment, financial deficits and lack of dynamic leadership
[Millett, 1976].

Once identified, steps can be taken to prevent them

from exploding into a major crisis for the institution.
Institutions should consider the use of consultants in a merger
situation to assist with evaluation, plan development, negotiations and
implementation.

Legal counsel should be used to handle the variety of

legal issues involved and to write the merger agreement document.
Legal advice can also help to save time and eliminate problems as it
did in the Parsons merger by implementing an innovative corporate
strategy involving governing boards.

Management consultants can

bring a fresh perspective to assessing an institution's strengths and
weaknesses and assist with implementation.

It is important to

remember, however, that consultants should not make policy
decisions, but advise and assist policy makers and implementors.
Psychologists and sociologists can also help faculty, staff and students
to cope with concerns.
Post merger follow-up studies by administrators ought to be
conducted to evaluate and monitor what has happened.

This will not

only provide a body of knowledge of what went right and what went
wrong, but will also enable administrators to monitor the adjustment
period and identify any problems to be addressed.

A merger is a

process that does not end with the signing of the agreement or on the
first day of operation of the merged institution.

The process continues

for several years after the effective date of a merger.
Alternatives to a merger should be given careful consideration.
The institution should clearly identify what objectives it hopes to
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accomplish through a merger.

Alternatives such as voluntary

cooperation, consortia, federation and Chapter 11 bankruptcy
procedures can then be evaluated according to these objectives.

Pros

and cons of each alternative can then be compared and the option that
best meets the objectives can be selected.
Finally, the use of strategic planning should be considered as a
mechanism that will enable institutions to be better prepared for the
possibility of a merger, to minimize the negative aspects associated
with one and to implement the recommendations in this study.

It

could also help institutions avoid negative factors that could lead to a
merger.

Strategic planning involves "the ongoing analysis of the

institutional environment to ascertain what long term changes are
occurring which may provide opportunities with relation to emerging
educational needs or demands"

[Young, 1981, p. 1].

It enables the

institution to manage or influence change rather than merely reacting
to it.

This is accomplished by identifying and assessing changing

external social, political and economic factors that could affect the
institution and its programs in the long term.

Strategic options are

then developed to enable the institution to respond to them in a
planned way by changing its goals, objectives, organizations, programs,
etc.

Strategic planning is ongoing and should involve in its formulation

representatives of various constituent groups.
A strategic plan for any institution ought to include a merger
option as a response to certain environmental factors such as changing
demand, spiraling cost, need for complimentary or diversified
programs, demographic changes, need for better market position,
increased need for a stronger lobby for state and federal funds, need
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to satisfy demands for accountability and control, etc.

A merger with

another institution is certainly one option that enables the institution
to meet and manage these particular environmental factors.

Other

alternatives (cooperative arrangements, consortium, federation, etc.)
should also be identified and evaluated as part of the plan.

The plan

should also contain contingency options if the institution starts down
the merger path but does not find a suitable partner or arrangement.
Strategic planning also provides a mechanism to implement the
various management strategies based on the recommended integrated
frame approach.

It enables the institution to involve individuals in a

variety of ways to identify, discuss and develop responses to a wide
range of environmental factors.

It is done during a non-crisis period

when the process can be more encompassing and deliberate.

The

option of a merger and all its implications can then be discussed in a
more open manner using the integrated frame strategies.

Of course,

there still may be a need for some secrecy when representatives of a
private institution are discussing the possibility of a merger with
another

institution.

By having a strategic plan in place, the institution is in a position
to avoid or minimize the divisive conflict and trauma that results with
no plan or poor management of the merger process.

It is also possible

that a good strategic plan and planning mechanism may enable the
institutions to avoid circumstances which traditionally have led to
merger—financial exigency for private institutions and greater
accountability for public institutions.

For the former group, a good

strategic plan should lessen the chances of an institution plunging into
a major financial crisis.

For the latter group, the fact that a public
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institution has an effective strategic planning mechanism in place may
convince public officials external to the institutions that increased
educational opportunity and accountability are taking place without
their intervention.

Strategic planning is also an ideal mechanism to

implement the earlier recommendations made relative to evaluating
the operation of an institution for more efficiency and monitoring for
signs which may indicate the need for a merger.

According to Shirley

[1988], "strategic planning offers colleges and universities a powerful
means of shaping their futures in a rapidly changing environment”
[p. 14].
Table 4 presents a summary of the management strategies that
are being recommended to enhance the merger process. When
compared to Table 1, it specifies how the recommendations address
the shortcomings of the mergers studied.

Table 4
Management Recommendations by Process Elements
Element

Recommendation

Change
Power
Decision-making
Crisis
Conflict
Objectives

Managed and facilitated
Shared with stakeholders
Consultative and participatory
Planned response with alternatives
Resolved through integrated frames
Address needs of organization and
participants
Provide support
Strategic plan to anticipate and guide
Integrated frames approach

Participants
Planning
Implementation
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Additional

Study

This study has presented several recommendations for
institutions to plan for and manage the merger process in a more
effective and efficient manner.

Studies of the application of these

strategies to an actual merger situation should yield valuable data on
their appropriateness and effectiveness.

Most studies of the merger

phenomenon take place in a time frame shortly after the merger.
Longitudinal studies or studies conducted several years after a merger,
should also be undertaken to gain a perspective on the long term
impact of the process.
Very few studies of the merger phenomenon address the outcome
of mergers, especially the impact that it has on individual participants.
Because individuals within the organization play a crucial role in the
implementation of a merger, studies ought to be conducted on how
they perceive the merger experience and the effects that it had on
them.
The dissertation case studies focused on institutions that merged
because of financial exigency or external public policy initiative.
Studies should be conducted on the mergers of institutions that take
place because of non-economic reasons (private sector) and
institutional driven reasons (public sector).

In the latter category, the

recent merger of the University of Lowell and Southeastern
Massachusetts University into the University of Massachusetts, which
was initiated from within the institutions, should provide information
that can be compared with the findings of this study.
At the outset of this study, it was noted from limited personal
experience that the merging of institutions of higher education did not
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appear to be well planned or implemented.

As the study evolved, it

became apparent that this was the case in most of the mergers
studied.

A lack of a broad understanding by policy makers and

administrators of the tensions and elements that constitute the merger
phenomenon contributes to this less than desirable situation.

This

study has indicated that the merger of institutions of higher education
can be a viable strategy for meeting and adapting to change.

To be

effective in meeting objectives and minimizing negative impacts on
participants, it must be planned and managed so that change, conflict
and crisis can produce positive results for both the organization and
the individual.

This study has presented one perspective on

facilitating that outcome.
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APPENDIX B
LIST OF THE MERGERS STUDIED

1.

Arkansas Agricultural, Mechanical and Normal College into
the University of Arkansas at Pine Buff (1972).

2.

Barrington College and Gordon College (1985).

3.

Blue Hills Technical Institute into Massasoit Community
College (1985).

4.

Boston State College into the University of Massachusetts at
Boston (1982).

5.

Bradford Durfee College of Technology and New Bedford
Institute of Technology into Southeastern Massachusetts
University (1964).

6.

Detroit College of Business and Davenport College (1985).

7.

District of Columbia, Federal City College and Washington
Technical Institute into the University of the District of
Columbia (1974).

8.

Lowell State College and Lowell Technological Institute into
University of Lowell (1975).

9.

Milwaukee-Downer College and Lawrence College (1964).

10.

New College and University of South Florida (1975).

11.

Oregon State University School of Education with Western
Oregon State College Division of Education (1982).

12.

Owen College and Lemoyne College (1981).

13.

Parsons School of Design and New School of Social Research
(1970).

14.

Salisbury State with the University of Maryland Eastern Shore
(proposed 1976).

15.

University of Louisville into state system (1970).
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16.

University of Omaha into University of Nebraska at Omaha
(1968).

17.

The University of Wisconsin System (1971).

18.

Western College and Miami (Ohio) University (1974).

19.

Wichita University into Wichita State University (1964).

20.

Two unnamed public colleges (1975).
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